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United States Court of Appeals 

for the 

District of Columbia Circuit 



TRANSCRIPT OF 
RECORD 















Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 

APEIL TEEM, 1933 

No. 6025 


MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, APPELLANT, 


WALTER S. ANDREWS REGINALD S. HUIDE- 
KOPER, MORGAN BELMONT, TRUSTEES, AND 
MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX 
UNDER THE WILL OF PAUL A. ANDREWS, DE¬ 
CEASED, APPELLEES. 


APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA. 


INDEX 

Original Print 


Caption . a 1 

Petition . 1 2 

Decree . 20 16 

Petition and report of trustees. 25 19 

Decree approving account of trustees. 35 27 

Supplemental petition of trustees for instructions. 36 28 

Exhibit “A”. 44 35 

Answer and return of Margaret Andrews Belmont. 45 35 

Last will of Frank W. Andrews. 48 38 

Memorandum of court. 55 43 

Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews for a rehearing. 56 44 

Memorandum in support of petition for a rehearing.... 56 44 

Answer of Walter S. Andrews et al., trustees, to petition 

for rehearing. 60 47 

Answer of Margaret Andrews Belmont to petition for re¬ 
hearing . 61 47 

Memorandum opposing petition for rehearing. 61 48 

Opinion of Justice O. R. Luhring. 62 48 

Decree instructing trustees. 69 54 

Appeal noted by Margaret Andrews Belmont and under¬ 
taking for costs on appeal fixed at $100 or a superse¬ 
deas at $4,000. 71 56 

Memorandum: Supersedeas bond ($4,000) on appeal ap¬ 
proved and filed. 71 56 

Assignments of error. 71 56 

Designation of record. 73 57 

Clerk’s certificate. 75 59 


Judd & Detweiler (Inc.), Printers, Washington, D. C., August 28,1933, 
























Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 


No. 6025. 

| 

Margaret Andrews Belmont, Appellant, 

v. 

Walter S. Andrews, et al. 


a Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 

Equity. No. 53738. 

Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, {Morgan 

Belmont, Petitioners, 

v. 

Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. An- 
drews, Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews, 
and Margaret A. Belmont, Infant, Defendants. 

United States of America, 

District of Columbia , ss: 

Be it remembered, That in the Supreme Court of the 
District of Columbia, at the City of Washington, in said 
District, at the times hereinafter mentioned, the following 
papers were filed and proceedings had, in the above-entitled 
cause, to-wit: 


1—6025a 


2 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

1 In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 

Holding an Equity Court. 

Equity. No. 53738. 

Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, Morgan 

Belmont, Petitioners, 


v. 

Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. An- 
drews, Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews, 
and Margaret A. Belmont, Infant, Defendants. 

Petition 

Filed December 1, 1931. 

The petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huide¬ 
koper and Morgan Belmont, respectfully represents to the 
Court as follows: 

1. That the petitioner Walter S. Andrews is a citizen of 
the United States and a resident of Newport, in the State 
of Rhode Island, and files this petition in his own right as 
devisee and as Trustee under the Will of Frank W. An¬ 
drews, deceased; that the petitioner Reginald S. Huide¬ 
koper is a citizen of the United States and a resident of 
the District of Columbia and files this petition as Substi¬ 
tuted Trustee under the said Will pursuant to a decree of 
this Honorable Court, entered in Equity Cause No. 31656 
on the 16th day of May, 1913, substituting him as Trustee, 
vice Oscar Luckett, deceased; that the petitioner Morgan 
Belmont is a citizen of the United States and a resi- 
2 dent of : the Town of Westbury, Nassau County, in 
the State of New York and files this petition as Sub¬ 
stituted Trustee under the said Will pursuant to a decree 
entered in said Equity Cause No. 31656 on the 14th day of 
January, 1929, substituting him as Trustee, vice Paul A. 
Andrews, resigned. All of which pleadings, proceedings, 
orders and decrees are matters of record in the said Equity 
Cause No. 31,656, and it is prayed that they may be re¬ 
ferred to and considered as part of this petition. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


3 


That the petitioners bring this suit, for the reasons here¬ 
inafter set forth, on behalf of all persons who now have or 
may hereafter be entitled to any interest in the Estate of 
the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased. 

II. That all of the defendants are citizens of the United 
States; that the defendant Frank W. Andrews, fcorn in 
1902, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode 
Island; that the defendant William T. Andrews, iborn in 
1905, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode 
Island; that the defendant John K. C. Andrews, porn in 
1909, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode 
Island; that the defendant Margaret Andrews Belmont, 
born in 1894, is the same person who was named in the 
Original Bill filed in said Equity Cause No. 31656 as Mar¬ 
garet Frances Andrews, she having intermarried With the 
petitioner Morgan Belmont, and is a resident of th^ Town 
of Westbury, Nassau County, in the State of New] York; 
that the defendant Paul A. Andrews, formerly a resident 
of the City of Newport, State of Rhode Island, is npw tem¬ 
porarily domiciled in the City of Washington, District of 
(Columbia; that the defendant Margaret A. Belniont, a 
minor of the age of fourteen years, born on jVIay 9, 
3 1917, is the only child of the said petitioner Morgan 

Belmont and his said wife, the defendant Margaret 
Andrews Belmont, and resides with her parents in the town 
of Westbury, Nassau County, in the State of New York; 
that the petitioner Walter S. Andrews and the defendants 
named herein, are respectively the sole living children, 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the said (Frank 
W. Andrews deceased, and as such, the sole living deVisees, 
legatees and distributees under the Last Will and testa¬ 
ment of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, late a resident of 
Middleton, in the State of Rhode Island, bearing datb Sep¬ 
tember 25, 1902, a certified copy whereof was admitted to 
probate and record in the District of Columbia, by order 
of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding 
a Probate Court, entered on the 8th day of July, 1903, in 
Administration Case No. 11591, as will appear frofn the 
original Bill filed in said Equity Cause No. 31656, and the 
proceedings thereunder, which are prayed to be re^d as 
part of this petition. 




4 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


That the said defendants are sued in his, her and their 
own right as devisees, legatees and beneficiaries under 
the Will of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and as 
representing persons of the same respective class, if any, 
hereafter born, who may now have, or may hereafter be 
entitled to have, any interest in the estate of the said 
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, under his said Will. 

III. That your petitioner Walter S. Andrews was ap¬ 
pointed one of the original Trustees under the provisions 
of the said Will of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, 
and is now acting as such; and your petitioners Reginald 
S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont were Substituted 
Trustees under the said Will and are still acting as 
4 such, pursuant to the said decrees hereinabove re¬ 
ferred to, with all the powers and duties as if they 
had been originally appointed by and under the provisions 
of the said Will. 

That as Trustees as aforesaid, your petitioners now hold 
title for all persons who may have or who may hereafter 
be entitled to any interest, whether legal or equitable, in 
the Estate of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, under 
his Will, and especially fo the following improved real 
estate in the District of Columbia: 

(1) Lots numbered Three (3) and Four (4) in Mary A. 
Derby’s subdivision of Square One Hundred and SMv-two 
(162) as per plat recorded in Liber W. B. M. at Folio 401 
of the Records of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia, 
improved by part of the Grafton Hotel; (2) Lot numbered 
Fourteen (14) in Square Two Thousand, Five Hundred 
and Seventeen (2517) improved by the Wendell Mansions; 
and (3) Lot numbered Nine (9) in Square Two Hundred 
and Eighteen (218) improved by the Edmonds Building. 

That the said Edmonds Building was purchased by the 
then Trustees in July 1923, and title to the said property 
was conveyed to the then Trustees under the Will of the 
said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, by a deed in trust dated 
and recorded July 30, 1923 in Liber 5039 at Folio 201 of 
the Land Records of the District of Columbia. That the 
said deed in trust recited that the then Trustees under the 
Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, pursuant to the 
powers vested in them by the said Will, had invested the 
proceeds of sale of certain real property belonging to the 
said Estate in the purchase of the property conveyed to 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


5 


them by said deed in trust and herein designated as 

5 the Edmonds Building. That by the said deed in 
trust title in fee simple was conveyed to the then 

Trustees of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, 
subject to a former deed of trust, dated June 1, }921 and 
recorded June 8,1921, in Liber 4561 at Folio 69 of the Land 
Records of the District of Columbia, securing the: sum of 
$250,000 evidenced by notes of the former owners of the 
said property dated June 1, 1921 and due June 1, 1924, all 
of which said notes are now held and owned by Itlie said 
Trustees. 

That in order to pay said prior incumbrance on the said 
property, the then Trustees by their deed of trust dated 
January 7, 1924, and recorded January 28, 1924 in Liber 
5162 at Folio 65 of the Land Records of the District of Co¬ 
lumbia, secured the sum of $250,000 on the said property 
evidenced by their said notes as said Trustees bearing in¬ 
terest at six per cent, payable January 27, 1929, wliich last 
mentioned deed of trust recited i ‘said money being loaned 
for the purpose of paying off the (then) present first deed 
of trust for Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars”, 
which was done. 

That by paying off the said prior incumbrance, with 
funds derived from their said deed of trust, the said Trus¬ 
tees became subrogated to all the rights of the holders of 
the notes secured by said prior incumbrance of the prop¬ 
erty at the time it was purchased. 

That thereafter the present Trustees extended $25,000 
of their said notes to January 27, 1932 and $22^,000 of 
their said notes to January 27, 1934, and the same now 
the only existing liens upon the said property, and 

6 represent the balance of the deferred purchase price 
of the said property. 

IV. Your petitioners further represent that under the 
terms and provisions of the said Will of the said Frank 
W. Andrews, deceased, and in accordance with tne said 
decrees entered herein on the 16th day of May, 1913, and 
on the 14th day of January, 1929, your petitioners, Walter 
S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont 
are now vested as Trustees with the fee simple title to the 
real estate belonging to the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, 
deceased, which is wholly within the District of Columbia, 



6 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


in and upon the following trusts, amongst others, as set 
forth in the said Will, viz: 

“To hold, manage and direct the same during the lives 
of my said two sons and the life of the survivor or longest 
liver of them, and upon the death of the survivor or longest 
liver of my said two sons, my Trustees shall convey in fee 
simple, transfer and pay over said trust property as it shall 
then exist and free of any trust or condition to my lawful 
issue then living, they taking by representation, according 
to the stocks; provided, however, that if upon the decease 
of the survivor or longest liver of my said two sons, there 
shall be no lawful issue of mine then living, my Trustees 
shall then convey in fee simple, transfer and pay over said 
trust property as it shall then exist, and free of any trust 
or condition, to those persons who are at that time my 
heirs by blood, and my Trustees shall dispose of the net 
rents and income of said trust property arising before the 
conveyance just directed, as follows: They shall pay the 
said net rents and income during the continuance of this 
trust in equal quarterly payments in every year in 
7 equal shares to such of my said two sons as may be 
living at the time of payment and to the lawful issue 
then living of either of my said two sons who has then de¬ 
ceased (whether such my son have died before or after me) 
such issue taking by representation according to the stocks 
the share which such my deceased son would have taken if 
living. * * * 

“Seventh. I hereby authorize and empower the Trus¬ 
tees or Trustee for the time being under this Will, in their 
or his discretion to sell at public auction or private sale, 
or lease, any portion or the whole of the estate, real and 
personal, which they or he may hold under the trust created 
by this will, and to execute and deliver good and sufficient 
deeds and other instruments to convey and transfer the 
same. And wherever it shall become necessary to make the 
final distribution of any property held in trust under this 
will, the Trustees or Trustee for the time being shall have 
like authority for the purpose of such distribution to sell 
and convert into money the whole or any portion of such 
property, whether real or personal; and I direct my Trus¬ 
tees to reinvest the proceeds of any real estate sold, in other 
productive real estate.” 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 7 

V. Your petitioners further represent that the only two 
sons of the said Testator, Frank W. Andrews, deceased, are 
(1) the defendant Paul A. Andrews and (2) the petitioner 
Walter S. Andrews, each of whom under the terms of their 
father’s Will is entitled to receive during his life one-half 
of the net income of the said Estate; that the qefendant 
Margaret Andrews Belmont is the only child of the said 
Paul A. Andrews, and as such has a vested interest in one- 
half of the residuum of the said Estate; that the defend¬ 
ants Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews and 

8 John K. C. Andrews, who have no issue, are the only 
children of the said Walter S. Andrews (now di¬ 
vorced) and as such have a vested interest equally amongst 
themselves, in the other one-half of the residuum oij the said 
Estate; that the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, la minor, 
as daughter of the defendant Margaret Andrews Belmont, 
will be entitled by way of executory devise, to the j share in 
the said Estate now vested in her mother in case hep mother 
should die before the two sons of the Testator (^ho have 
only a life interest in the income) and the interest of the 
said minor in the said Estate is now wholly contingent; 
and that the above named persons are the only lining per¬ 
sons having directly, or indirectly, any right, title or in¬ 
terest in the Estate of the said Frank W. Andrews, de¬ 
ceased, under his Will. 

VI. Your petitioners further represent that though the 
power to mortgage or to give deeds of trust is not in ex¬ 
press terms provided for in the said Will, they are ad¬ 
vised that such power is by reasonable intendment and im¬ 
plication, necessarily vested in the Trustees under the 
terms of the said Will and should be judicially declared to 
be vested in the said Trustees in order to carry out the real 
intention of the Testator and to preserve the said Estate 
from loss. 

Your petitioners are informed, believe and therefore 
aver that the said Testator purchased in 1899 two adjoin¬ 
ing pieces of property on F Street in the City of Wash¬ 
ington, D. C., and made and executed his deeds or trust 
securing his notes dated October 6, 1899, in the sum of 
$30,000.00 secured on one parcel, and in the sum of 
$40,000.00 secured on the other parcel. These note^, in the 
aggregate sum of $70,000.00 the said Testator ex- 

9 tended by endorsement so as to become due ^Lpril 6, 
1905. The Testator in his Will, dated September 25, 



8 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


1902, refers to this indebtedness, when he provided (Para¬ 
graph V) that his widow (since deceased) out of the in¬ 
come which she was given for life, should pay “the in¬ 
terest on all debts secured by any lien upon any of my said 
real estate”. The Testator died in May, 1903. After the 
death of the said Testator, further extensions of these 
notes were accepted by the holders thereof, until they were 
finally paid off in 1919 by the Trustees under the said Tes¬ 
tator’s Will with proceeds of real estate sold. Other funds 
derived from the sales of these F Street properties sold by 
the said Trustees were used in part payment of the pur¬ 
chase of the Edmonds Building. Your petitioners are ad¬ 
vised, believe and therefore aver that if the holders of 
these $70,000.00 of notes had refused to extend the same 
after this trust became active, the real estate securing these 
loans would have been sold to satisfv the indebtedness and 

w 

lost to the said Estate, unless the said Will were construed 
to empower the said Trustees to give a mortgage or deed 
of trust to pay or renew the loans made by the Testator. 

Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore aver 
that the Testator knew at the time he executed his said 
Will, that his Trustees would be confronted with the neces¬ 
sity of mortgaging or giving deeds of trust securing loans 
on the properties vested in them under his Will (unless his 
Trustees could induce the holders of the Testator’s notes to 
extend them) and the said Testator knew that the Estate 
could not be otherwise managed and controlled by his said 
Trustees without their having the power to mortgage or 
give deeds of trust so as to preserve the said Estate, 
10 and he fully intended by his said Will that his said 
Trustees should be vested with such powers. 

Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore aver 
that the provisions of the said Testator’s Will that the 
Trustees shall “hold, manage and direct” the property 
vested in them, with discretion to sell * * * or lease any 
portion or the whole of the Estate” * * * and “to re¬ 
invest the proceeds of any real estate sold, in other produc¬ 
tive real estate”, must be read in connection with the fact 
that the Testator left his property incumbered, and thereby 
imposed the duty on his Trustees of refinancing the prop¬ 
erty by mortgage or deed of trust, in order to “hold, man¬ 
age and direct” the same and to preserve it for the uses 
set out in the said Will. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 9 

VII. Your petitioners further represent that pursuant 
to the powers and discretion vested in the Trustees by the 
terms of the said Will, the said Trustees have, oti several 
occasions sold real estate and reinvested the proceeds in 
other real estate in this District as required by t}he terms 
of the said Will. But the said Trustees have been unable 
at the time of making a sale to obtain “other productive 
real estate’’ of equal market value as the property sold. 
It is quite impossible to sell one piece of real estate and 
reinvest the proceeds in another piece without Either re¬ 
ceiving a small amount of cash, which is too smkll to in¬ 
vest in “other productive real estate”, or assuming a deed 
of trust securing the balance of the unpaid purchase money 
on the property purchased. 

Your petitioners further represent that when jthe then 
Trustees purchased the Edmonds Building, as set forth in 
the third paragraph of this petition, they were advised by 
a local Title Company that in its opinion jthe said 
11 Trustees had the power under the said WilJ to pur¬ 
chase the said property subject to deeds of trust se¬ 
curing the balance of the purchase price, and the sdid Trus¬ 
tees had the power to encumber by mortgage or deed of 
trust in continuation or renewal of the purchase money 
trusts, or prior existing encumbrances. 

Your petitioners further represent that pursuant thereto 
the then Trustees executed their deed of trust dated Janu¬ 
ary 7, 1924 (referred to in the third paragraph of this 
petition), secured on the Edmonds Building, whicq recited 
that “said money being loaned for the purpose of paying 
off the (then) present first deed of trust for Two Hundred 
and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) on the property 
hereinbefore described, as provided in said deed of trust”. 
After executing the said deed of trust dated January 7, 
1924 refinancing the said $250,000 prior existing frust on 
the Edmonds Building, the said Title Company issued to 
the then Trustees its certificate of title dated January 30, 
1924, certifying that the lien created by the said deed of 
trust was a lien upon the said property. 

VIII. Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore 
aver that such construction of the said Will of F|ank W. 
Andrews, deceased, is in accord with the trend of authorita¬ 
tive decisions construing similar Wills not containing in 
express words the power to mortgage, and is the true con¬ 
struction to be given to the said Will in order to carry out 


10 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

the intention of the Testator, and that so long as the Trus¬ 
tees do not deplete the value of the corpus of the Estate as 
the Testator left it, they have full power under the terms 
of the said Will in acquiring new property, to assume or 
give a purchase money trust for what they, in their 

12 discretion, consider is the excess value of the prop¬ 
erty acquired over the value of the property sold. 

Your petitioners further aver that the then Trustees, in 
acquiring the said Edmonds Building in 1924, did, in their 
judgment and discretion, believe its true value to be in 
excess of the yalue of the property then sold to the extent of 
the trusts given or assumed, and that the purchase of the 
Edmonds Building, subject to the terms above set forth, 
would be in the best interests of the said Estate. That in 
giving or assuming the said purchase money trusts on the 
Edmonds Building for the excess value thereof over the 
value of the property sold, the then Trustees did not deplete 
the value of the corpus of the Estate as the Testator left it. 

IX. Your petitioners further aver that of the $250,000 of 
notes secured on the Edmonds Building, under the deed of 
trust dated January 7, 1924, referred to in the third para¬ 
graph of this petition, $225,000 of said notes have been 
extended to January 27, 1934 and are now held by the 
Acacia Mutual Life Association, and $25,000 of said notes 
have been extended to Januarv 7, 1932 and are now held bv 
the Potomac Insurance Company, which company has in¬ 
formed your petitioners that it wishes these $25,000 notes 
paid at the date of extension maturity. 

Your petitioners further aver that as the said Will re¬ 
quires the corpus of this Estate to be invested in real estate, 
they have no cash in their hands belonging to the corpus of 
the said Estate with which to pay the said notes when the 
same become due, and if the said $25,000 of notes are not 
then paid the remaining $225,000 of notes will, under the 
terms of the said deed of trust, immediately fall due, 

13 and the said property will be sold and the proceeds 
applied first in payment of the $225,000 note, and the 

balance to the $25,000 as provided im the terms of the said 
deed of trust. 

Your petitioners further aver that they are advised that 
many pieces of real estate in this city have recently been 
sold at auction but in most instances there are few active 
bidders and most of such sales have resulted in the note¬ 
holders purchasing the property themselves. That in the 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 11 

present depressed condition of the real estate market, your 
petitioners fear that if the said Edmonds Building were 
now advertised for sale under the terms of the said deed 
of trust, its value would be lost to the Andrews Estate to 
the great hardship and detriment thereof and that a fore¬ 
closure might result in a deficiency judgment wh^ch would 
consume all, or a large part of the trust estate. 

X. Your petitioners further aver that all the living resid¬ 
uary adult heirs under the said Will, and Walter S. An¬ 
drews in his individual right, have made and executed an 
Indenture of Ratification and Authorization, signed and 
accepted by the petitioners herein, a copy whereof is hereto 
appended and prayed to be read as part of this petition. 
That all of the parties hereto were parties to the said In¬ 
denture, excepting Paul A. Andrews, who as oiie of the 
Trustees, purchased the Edmonds Building, and joined in 
the execution of the instruments to acquire and fiiiance the 
same, and also as one of the then Trustees made and exe¬ 
cuted the said deed of trust dated January 7, 1924 and the 
said $250,000 of notes secured thereby; and excepting the 
defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor. 

That by the terms of the said Indenture, the said 
14 parties thereto have nunc pro tunc ratified, confirmed 
and approved the purchase of the property im¬ 
proved by the Edmonds Building, and the execution and 
delivery of the said deed of trust dated January 7,1924, and 
the execution and delivery and extension of the sapid $250,- 
000 of notes secured thereby, representing the balance of 
the purchase money due. 

That by the terms of the said Indenture, the said parties 
thereto did covenant, agree and declare with eacji other, 
and with the petitioners herein as follows: | 

“The present Trustees and their successors arb hereby 
authorized and vested with the power to encumber the prop¬ 
erty described in the said deed of trust dated Jahuary 7, 
1924 and, recorded January 28, 1924 in Liber 5162 at Folio 
85 of the Land Records of the District of Columbia] and/or 
any other property belonging to the said estate, by mort¬ 
gage or deed of trust in continuation or renewal or re¬ 
renewals of the aforesaid deed of trust in the anjount of 
$250,000 or any part thereof, upon such terms as tq rate of 
interest, duration and time and mode of repayment of 
the loan, or any part thereof and in all other respects, as 


12 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

shall be approved by the said Trustees, or the survivor of 
them, and their successors .’ 9 

And by the said Indenture the said parties thereto did 
ratify and confirm whatever the said Trustees have done, 
or may do, by virtue of the said instrument. 

XI. Your petitioners further aver that in order to pay 
off the said $25,000 of notes dated January 7, 1924 when 
they fall due next January, and the balance of the said first 
trust loan in the sum of $225,000 which falls due in January 
1934, all representing the balance due on the purchase price 
of the said property, it will be necessary for the said Trus¬ 
tees to execute new notes secured by new deeds of 

15 trust, and they cannot advantageously borrow $25,- 
000 next January on what would be a second trust 
on the Edmonds Building, for the remaining part of the 
first trust amounting to $225,000 does not become due until 
January 1934. With the authorization of the Court the said 
Trustees could borrow a sufficient sum to make said pay¬ 
ment and defray other charges on first trust notes secured 
on the said Grafton Hotel or the said Wendell Mansions, 
belonging to the said Estate, both of which properties are 
unincumbered, thereby preserving the said Estate and pre¬ 
venting waste thereto, which would be irreperable, unless 
this authority is granted. 

XII. Your petitioners further represent that on the real 
estate belonging to the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, de¬ 
ceased, is a hotel about 35 years old, an apartment house, 
and an office building. That due to the depressed condi¬ 
tion of real estate in the City of Washington, these proper¬ 
ties are not producing the income which was previously 
derived from them, and the net earnings have greatly di¬ 
minished, principally due to vacancies. That your peti¬ 
tioners are unable at the present time to state whether they 
will have on hand sufficient funds with which to pay taxes 
and other charges when they become due, and therefore ask 
leave of this Honorable Court, if necessity should arise, to 
borrow necessary money to meet taxes and other charges, 
in order to preserve the said Estate and to prevent waste. 

XIII. Your i petitioners are further advised and aver 
that this Court, in the exercise of its broad Chancery 
powers and jurisdiction to administer trust estates, and to 
remove clouds from the title of the trust Res, direct trus¬ 
tees and conserve and protect the assets thereof for the 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


13 


benefit of all persons who may have any interest 

16 or possibility of interest therein, and especially in 
the interest of minor or unborn beneficiaries, may 

not only construe the provisions of said Last ^ill and 
Testament of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, as thereinbe¬ 
fore prayed, but may give such interpretation thereto as 
will carry out the real intent of the Testator to preserve 
the trust estate during the existence of the trust, and if it 
should find that the assumption and renewal of tfye afore¬ 
said prior existing trust upon the Edmonds Building and 
the giving of said new trust in payment or renewal thereof, 
or substitution therefor, was for the best interest of the 
Trust Estate, and that, in order to save and protect the 
Trust Estate from loss, the existing trust should be re¬ 
newed, reduced or extended and/or that any other real or 
personal property of the Estate should be mortgaged or 
pledged for the protection and conservation of tlje Trust 
Estate as a whole, it may instruct, authorize and direct 
your petitioners, as Trustees, to make whatever payments, 
sales, loans, encumbrances or financial arrangements may 
be necessary to that end and to carry the same inj;o effect 
by such notes, contracts, mortgages and/or other instru¬ 
ments of conveyance and/or other evidences of indebted¬ 
ness as may be requisite. 

Wherefore, the premises considered, the said petitioners 
pray as follows: 

1. That process of this Honorable Court may issue forth¬ 
with to the defendants, Frank W. Andrews, Wiljiam T. 
Andrews, John K. C. Andrews, Margaret Andrews Belmont 
and Paul A. Andrews and each of them, and to the defend¬ 
ant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor, (as provided by Sec. 
102 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia,) to¬ 
gether with a copy of this petition, requiring them 

17 and each of them to appear and answer to this peti¬ 
tion, answer by them and each of them under oath 

being hereby expressly waived. 

2. That thereafter a guardian ad litem may be duly ap¬ 
pointed for the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor, 
to appear for and defend this petition for said minor. 

3. That the petitioners may have substitute service by 
way of publication against such of the defendants ^s may 
be returned by the Marshal not to be found within tjhe Dis¬ 
trict of Columbia and who do not personally appejar and 
make answer to this petition. 



14 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


4. That a decree may be entered ratifying, confirming 
and approving the purchase by the then Trustees of Lot 
9, Square 218, with improvements thereon, known as the 
Edmonds Building, upon the trusts and subject to a former 
deed of trust in the sum of $250,000, set forth in the said 
deed in trust conveying title to the said Trustees. 

5. That a decree may be entered herein ratifying, con¬ 
firming and approving the execution and delivery by the 
then Trustees of the said deed of trust, dated January 7, 
1924, and recorded in Liber 5162 at Folio 65 of the Land 
Records of the District of Columbia, and the notes secured 
thereby, in the sum of $250,000, on said Lot 9, Square 218, 
the said money being loaned for the purpose of paying off 
the then present first deed of trust for $250,000 on said 
property. 

6. That a decree may be entered herein ratifying, con¬ 
firming and approving the extension by the present Trus¬ 
tees of the said $250,000 first trust notes dated January 7, 
1924, secured by the said deed of trust on said Lot 9, Square 
218, with improvements thereon, and authorizing the said 

Trustees and their successors, to encumber the said 
18 property by mortgage or deed of trust in continua¬ 
tion or renewal of the aforesaid deed of trust thereon, 
in the sum of $250,000 or any part thereof, at such times 
and upon such terms and conditions as shall be approved 
by the said Trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them 
and their or his successors. 

7. That a decree may be entered herein construing the 
said Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to authorize and 
empower the Trustees acting under the said Will to en¬ 
cumber by mortgage or deed of trust, any piece or parcel 
of real estate owned by the said Estate, in continuation or 
renewal, or re-renewal, of a deed of trust on one parcel, 
given to secure the balance of the unpaid purchase price 
of said parcel, in an amount equal to the unpaid purchase 
price, or any part thereof, at such times and upon such 
terms and conditions as shall be approved by the said 
Trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them, and their 
or his successors, and to execute such notes, contracts, 
mortgages, de$ds, deeds of trust and/or other instruments 
as may be requisite, without obligation on the part of the 
mortgagee, pledgee, or transferee to see to the application 
of the money paid or loaned. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


15 


8. That in order to preserve the said Estate of fhe said 
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, from loss, and to provide 
necessary funds to meet existing encumbrances, charges 
and taxes when they fall due, a decree be entered herein 
authorizing and empowering the said Trustees acting under 
the said Will, to borrow an amount equal to the principal 
amount of existing encumbrances, charges and taxes, or any 
portion thereof, at such times, and upon such terhas and 

conditions as shall be approved by the said Trustees, 

19 or the survivors or survivor of them, theiij or his 
successors, and as they may consider for the best 

interests of the Trust Estate and to secure payment thereof 
by mortgage, pledge, and/or deed or deeds of trust, secured 
on any or all pieces or parcels of real estate owned by the 
said Estate, or any part thereof, and to renew and/or re¬ 
renew the same and/or extend the time for payment and 
to execute and deliver such notes, contracts, mortgages, 
deeds of trust and/or other instruments as may be requisite, 
without obligation on the part of the mortgagee, pledgee or 
transferee to see to the application of the money raaid or 
loaned. 

9. That this petition may be retained for such further in¬ 
structions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or any other 
parties to the cause may deem necessary or the necessities 
of the case cr protection of the Trust Estate may require. 

10. That the costs of these proceedings of all parties 
hereto with reasonable counsel fees be taxed against the 
corpus of the said Estate. 

11. That they may have such other and further relief as 
the nature of the case may require. 

WALTER S. ANDREWS, 

In His Own Right and as Trustee . 
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 

Substituted Trustee. 
MORGAN BELMONT, ! 

Substituted Trustee. 

McKENNEY, FLANNERY & CRAIGHILL, ! 

By J. S. FLANNERY, 

Attorneys for Petitioners . 

20 District of Columbia, ss: 

I, Reginald S. Huidekoper, being first duly sworn, de¬ 
pose and say that I am one of the petitioners naiped in 


16 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


the foregoing petition by me subscribed, and that I have 
read the foregoing petition and know the contents thereof, 
and that the matters and facts set forth upon personal 
knowledge are true and those matters and facts set forth 
upon information and belief, I believe to be true. 

REGINALD S. HTJIDEKOPER. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of Dec., 
1931. 

[notarial SEAL.] B. P. ISAACS. 


Decree. 

Filed Jan. 19, 1932. 

• •••*• • 

Upon consideration of the petition of Walter S. Andrews, 
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees 
of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, the answers 
of the adult defendants and the answer and report of F. 
Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem of the minor defendant 
Margaret A. Belmont, and it appearing to the Court that 
process has been duly served upon said infant defendant 
and upon her custodian, and the Court having considered 
the provisions of the will of said decedent, the briefs of 
counsel for the respective parties and the evidence filed in 
this cause, and it appearing from said evidence as to the 
character and value of the properties of the trust estate, 
the income therefrom, the encumbrances, taxes, expenses 
of suit and other charges which it will be necessary to pay 
and discharge immediately or in the near future, 
21 that the Trustees are without funds to pay said en¬ 
cumbrances and other obligations now due or shortly 
maturing, and that failure to pay the same will subject the 
trust estate to great and irreparable loss, and the Court 
being advised that in order to preserve the valuable prop¬ 
erties of the estate from sacrifice and to provide necessary 
funds to pay said encumbrances and obligations it will be 
for the best interest of the trust estate and of all persons 
having any vested or contingent interest therein and es¬ 
pecially for the benefit and advantage of said infant de¬ 
fendant, to borrow a sum of not to exceed Three Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($350,000) and to secure the same 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDBEWS ET AL. 17 

by a first mortgage or deed of trust upon the prpperties 
now comprising the trust estate,—it is this 19th day of 
January A. D. 1932, adjudged, ordered and decreed: 

I. The several sales, purchases, transfers and exchanges 
of various properties of the trust estate and the application 
of the proceeds of such sales and transfers as set forth in 
the evidence be and the same hereby are approved; 

II. The reinvestment of a porton of said proceeds in the 
purchase for the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($600,000) of Lot No. 9 in Square 218 in the City of Wash¬ 
ington, D. C., improved by the Edmonds Building, subject 
to a then first mortgage or deed of trust for Two E/undred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000), and the placing piereon 
of two other purchase money trusts aggregating OijLe Hun¬ 
dred Fifty-seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($157,- 
500), and the subsequent renewal of said original mortgage 
by the execution and delivery of a new deed of trust dated 

January 7th, 1924, recorded in Liber 5162, fol|o 65 of 
22 the Land Records of the District of Columbia, and 
the subsequent extension thereof, and the payment 
and discharge of said two purchase money mortgages with 
funds of the trust estate were proper exercises | of the 
powers, discretion and authority given to the Trustees by 
the will of said decedent and are hereby approved; 

III. It appearing from the evidence that the ium of 
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two Dollars 
and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the incbme of 
the estate and used for capital expenditures, the Trustees 
are hereby authorized and directed to reimburse and re¬ 
store to income said amount and to make the necesshrv ad¬ 
justment and charges against capital in their accounts to be 
hereafter submitted to the Court, and when the said s^mount 
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life ten- 

7 I 

ants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary; 

IV. The Trustees are further authorized and directed to 
pay out of the corpus of the trust estate, and to take credit 
therefor in their accounts to be hereafter submitted, to said 
F. Regis Noel, for his services as Guardian ad lite\n and 
attorney for said infant defendant, a fee of five hundred 
dollars; the agreed compensation of the expert appraisers 


2—6025a 



18 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

and witnesses; the fees of the attorneys for the Trustees 
in this proceeding and all other costs, expenses and charges 
connected with this litigation, and the expense of making 
and renewing loans; 

V. It appearing that the net income of the trust estate 
probably will be insufficient to pay the taxes, insurance, in¬ 
terest upon encumbrances and other charges upon the 
various properties of the estate, the Trustees are hereby 

authorized to charge the same, or any part thereof, 

23 to the corpus of the trust while a deficiency of net in¬ 
come exists and to pay the same out of the proceeds 

of the loan hereinafter authorized; 

VI. The Trustees are hereby further authorized to pay 
from the proceeds of said loan any amount now due them 
for commissions and expenses; 

VII. In order to provide for the payment of said first 
mortgage of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,- 
000), upon the Edmonds Building, as and when it falls due, 
and to make the other payments and disbursements herein¬ 
before authorized, the Trustees are hereby authorized, em¬ 
powered and directed to make whatever arrangements may 
be necessary for the renewal, extension and/or payment of 
the existing encumbrances or any part thereof and to bor¬ 
row’ a sum of not to exceed Three Hundred Fiftv Thousand 
Dollars ($350,000) upon the best terms obtainable, in such 
instalments, at such times and at such rates of interest as 
they may consider for the best interest of the trust estate, 
and to secure the same by the mortgage of any and/or all 
of the properties of the trust estate and especially of the 
following parcels, to w 7 it: 

(1) Lots numbered Three (3) and Four (4) in Mary A. 
Derby’s subdivision of Square One Hundred Sixty-two 
(162), as per plat recorded in Liber W. B. M. at folio Four 
Hundred One (401) of the records of the Surveyor of the 
District of Columbia, improved by premises knovm as the 
Grafton Hotel; 

(2) Lot numbered Fourteen (14) in Block numbered 
Tw’elve (12) in Rodgers and Stelhvagen, trustees’ subdi¬ 
vision knovm as “Kalorama Heights”, as per plat 

24 recorded in Liber County 7 at Folio 34 in the Sur- 
vevors Office of the District of Columbia; said Block 

12 now knowm for the purposes of assessment and taxation 
as Square numbered Twenty-five hundred and seventeen 



19 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

(2517), impoved by premises known as the Wendell 
Mansions; 

(3) Lot numbered Nine (9) in Square Two Hundred 
Eighteen (218), improved by premises known as the Ed¬ 
monds Building, all in the City of Washington, in the Dis¬ 
trict of Columbia, 

and from time to time, as occasion may arise, to arrange 
for the extension, renewal and/or payment of the amount 
borrowed or any part thereof; 

VIII. In amplification of the powers contained in the 
will of said decedent and of the additional powers given by 
this decree, said Trustees are hereby authorized and em¬ 
powered to make, execute and deliver such contracts, guar¬ 
anties, assignments, promissory notes, mortgages, fleeds of 
trust, deeds and/or other instruments of conveyance or 
title as may be requisite, without obligation upon the part 
of the mortgagees or transferees to see to the application 
of the money paid or loaned; 

IX. Jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retained for such 
further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or 
any other party to the cause may deem necessary or the 


necessities of the case may require. 

JESSE C. ADKINfjs, 

Justice. 

No objection. 

F. R. NOEL, 

Guardian ad Litem for 
Margaret A. Belmont. 

I consent to the passage of above decree. 

BENJ. S. MINOR, 


Atty. for Paul A. Andrews. 


25 Petition and Report of Trustees. 

Filed Apr. 8,1932. 

****** 

To the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding 
an Equity Court: 


The petition of Walter S. Andrews, surviving Testa¬ 
mentary Trustee, and Reginald S. Huidekoper and ^lorgan 
Belmont, Substituted Trustees, of the Estate of Fr^nk W. 
Andrews, deceased, respectfully shows unto the Court as 
follows: 



20 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

1. As averred in the “ Petition to Construe Will and In¬ 
struct Trustees”, filed in this cause on December 1, 1931, 
your petitioner, Walter S. Andrews, together with Paul A. 
Andrews, and Oscar Luckett (since deceased), were named 
trustees under the Will of the said Frank W. Andrews, 
deceased. By decree of this Honorable Court, entered in 
Equity cause No. 31656 on the 16tli day of May, 1913, your 
petitioner, Reginald S. Huidekoper, was substituted Trus¬ 
tee under the said Will, vice Oscar Luckett, deceased, and 
by further decree entered in said Equity Cause No. 31656 
on the 14th day of January, 1929, your petitioner, Morgan 
Belmont, was substituted Trustee under said Will vice Paul 
A. Andrews, whose resignation as Trustee was accepted by 
said last mentioned decree. All of the proceedings, plead¬ 
ings, orders, decrees, accounts, reports, Auditor’s reports, 
documents and exhibits which are matters of record in said 
Equity cause No. 31656, are prayed to be referred to and 
considered as part of this petition. 

2. The Testator’s widow, Maria F. Andrews, who had 
control of the Testator’s Estate during her lifetime, died 

on November 22, 1914, and this trust became active 
26 on December 1, 1914. 

When the Trustees assumed active management of 
the Estate, it consisted of five pieces of improved real 
estate in this District, namely: 

The Grafton Hotel, at Connecticut Avenue and DeSales 
Street; 

The Savoy Apartment House, 2804 14th St. N. W.; 

No. 1761 Massachusetts Avenue N. W., the testator’s 
residence; 

Nos. 1311-1313 F St. N. W., being one building, subject 
to a deed of trust of $30,000 given by the testator; 

No. 1309 F St. N. W., subject to a deed of trust of $40,000 
given by the testator, and 

Household effects appraised at $4,000 and later sold by 
the Trustees for that sum. 

Acting under the authority conferred upon them by the 
will of the testator, the Trustees made the following sales 
and reinvestments of the proceeds thereof: 

On October 1st, 1917, they sold the Savoy Apartment 
House and purchased the Wendell Mansions, 2339 Massa¬ 
chusetts Avenue N. W., for $120,000; 



21 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

On July 10th, 1918, they sold No. 1761 Massachusetts 
Avenue N. W., and used the proceeds to curtail the trusts 
on the F Street properties; 

On January 1st, 1920, they sold Nos. 1311-1313 F Street 
N. W., and purchased No. 1411 G Street N. W., with a part 
of the proceeds and used the balance to curtail liens on the 
trust property; 

On July 30th, 1923, they sold No. 1309 F Street N. W., 
and purchased the Edmonds Building, 915-917 15th Street 
N. W., improved by a ten-story building of concrete and 
fireproof construction, for a consideration of $600;000; 

On December 7th, 1926, they sold No. 1411 G Street 
N. W., at a profit of $32,802.50, and used part of the pro¬ 
ceeds to curtail liens on the Edmonds Building. 

The Estate now consists of the Edmonds Building, hav r 
ing a present assessed value of $401,400, which is encum¬ 
bered by a first trust of $225,000; the Graftdn Hotel, 
27 having a present assessed value of $384,020, and 
which is encumbered by a first trust of $125,^)00: and 
the Wendell Mansions, having a present assessed ]value of 
$109,862, and which is unencumbered. 

The Trustees ’ Revised Capital Account, which is at¬ 
tached hereto as Exhibit “ A” and prayed to be riad as a 
part hereof, contains a condensed summary of the sales of 
capital assets, the investment and reinvestment anc| the ap¬ 
plication of the proceeds thereof, curtail of loans, etc., from 
the date the trust became active until December 31st, 1931. 
Said Account is based upon reports heretofore filed \vith the 
Auditor in Equity Cause No. 31,656 and indicates that dur¬ 
ing the period in question $40,434.23 was advanced by in¬ 
come to capital, as hereinafter more fully set forth. 

3. Covering the entire period from December 1, 1914, to 
April 16, 1931, reports have been made in said Equity 
Cause No. 31656 of all receipts and disbursements of the 
said Trust Estate as follows: Beginning on April 17, 1915, 
and annually in the month of April in each year thereafter, 
including April, 1931, your petitioner Reginald S. Huide- 
koper, as Substituted Trustee, as aforesaid, has filed in said 
Equity Cause No. 31656 his report to the Auditor of the 
Court under Rule 69 thereof, which reports of Apr^l, 1929, 
1930 and 1931, respectively, were made in the joint names 
of Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, $s Sub¬ 


stituted Trustees of said Estate, under decree in said 


Equity 


Cause No. 31656. 




22 


M.; A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


4. The said annual reports made to the Auditor in said 
Equity Cause No. 31656 in addition to complying with the 
requirements of Rule 69, contain the following informa¬ 
tion, data and accounts respecting the properties belonging 

to the said Estate and the management thereof, since 

28 the date of the last previous report: 

(A) The properties held in trust under the Testator’s 
Will, the sales and purchases, if any, since the last previous 
report, and any changes affecting the Capital Assets, to¬ 
gether with a report of the receipts and disbursements cov¬ 
ering such transactions. 

(B) Itemized statements of all receipts and disburse¬ 
ments and balance on hand appearing in the “Income Ac¬ 
count” of said Trustee, supported by vouchers, together 
with paid and cancelled checks covering the disbursement 
items which iwere exhibited to the Auditor and checked by 
him with said itemized accounts filed in Equity Cause No. 
31656 and found to correspond therewith. 

No formal audit of these accounts was made bv the Audi- 
tor, although annually the said Paul A. Andrew’s and Walter 

S. Andrews,!as the sole persons then entitled to the income 
from said Estate, have approved each and every item of dis¬ 
bursement showm in said annual accounts, which cover the 
period from December 1, 1914, to April 16, 1931. 

5. Owdng to the fact that the provisions of the Will of the 
said Testator required all funds derived from the sale of 
real estate to be reinvested in other productive real estate, 
the Trustees of this Estate have been unable to create a 
capital cash | fund vdtli which to meet capital obligations, 
such as payment of curtails and extensions of loans, capi¬ 
tal betterments and charges, and frequently these have been 
paid out of income with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and 
Walter S. Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled to the net in¬ 
come from said Estate. 

6. By decree entered herein on January 19, 1932, it was 

directed that the sum of $32,982.06, which appeared 

29 from the evidence to have been taken from income 
and used for capital expenditures, should be restored 

to income and distributed to the life beneficiaries entitled 
to the net income and the said Trustees should make the 
necessary adjustments and changes in their accounts to be 
thereafter submitted to the Court and when the said amount 
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life ten- 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 23 

ants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of $1,000.00 
to each beneficiary. 

Said decree expressly retained jurisdiction of t^ie cause 
“for such further instructions, orders and decrees as the 
Trustees or any other party to the cause may dee^n neces¬ 
sary or the necessities of the case may require.” 

7. Your petitioners have hereunto annexed and marked 
“Exhibit B” and pray to be read as part hereof^ a sum¬ 
mary of the said Income Account heretofore filec} in said 
Equity Cause No. 31656, covering the period front Decem¬ 
ber 1, 1914, to April 16, 1931, showing all receipts and dis¬ 
bursements credited and debited to the Income Account as 
made, with such items therein as should have been charged 
and debited to the Capital Account, marked with a star (*). 

Your petitioners have hereunto annexed and marked 
“Exhibit C”, their supplemental Income Account showing 
in itemized form all receipts and disbursements credited 
and debited to Income as made, carrying the said Income 
Account from April 16, 1931, to December 31, 193JL, which 
your petitioners are prepared to support by vouchers and 
cancelled checks. In said account the items of payment 
which should have been paid by Capital are similarly 
marked with a star (*). 

8. The items in Exhibits B and C shown as Receipts 
30 from the Savoy Apartment, the Wendell Mansions 
and the Edmonds Building, are the actual (fash re¬ 
ceipts of this estate from the operating agents of su<fh prop¬ 
erties. 

There is appended hereto and marked “Exhibit ID” and 
prayed to be read as part of this petition a statement of 
Randall H. Hagner & Co., rental agents for the ^Yendell 
Mansions, showing that out of the rents collected, tlfey paid 
out of gross rents and deducted therefrom the sum of 
$1,213.78 for Frigidaire equipment in the Wendell Mansions 
and for Architect’s fee in remodeling for additional bath 
rooms, which said sum of $1,213.78 thereby becam^ a dis¬ 
bursement made by Income in behalf of Capital. 

9. There is hereto appended and marked “Exhibit E” 
and prayed to be read as part of this petition, a summary of 
the items marked with a star (*) in the Income Accounts set 
forth in “Exhibits B” and “C”, and the items hi “Ex¬ 
hibit D”. The said “Exhibit E” covers the period from 
December 1, 1914, to December 31, 1931, and lists all pay¬ 
ments made during said period, by Income on behalf of 



24 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


Capital, and payments made by Capital on behalf of In¬ 
come, resulting in excess payments made by Income on be¬ 
half of Capital during the said period, in the sum of 
$40,434.23, which is the same sum as shown by ‘ 4 Exhibit A” 
to be the cash deficiency in the Capital Account existing as 
of December 31, 1931. 

10. By said decree of January 19, 1932, your petitioners 
were “authorized, empowered and directed to make what¬ 
ever arrangements mav be necessarv for the renewal, ex- 
tension and for payment of existing encumbrances or any 
part thereof and to borrow a sum not to exceed $350,000 
upon the best terms obtainable, in such installments and at 
such rates of interest as they mav consider for the 
31 best interest of the trust estate, and to secure the 
same by the mortgage of any and/or all of the prop¬ 
erties of the trust estate'’ * * * and “to make, execute 
and deliver such contracts, guaranties, assignments, prom¬ 
issory notes, mortgages, deeds of trust, deeds, and or other 
instruments dr conveyance or title as may lie requisite”. 

In accordance with the provisions of the said decree, your 
petitioners secured a sixty day extension of the $25,000 of 
notes due January 27, 1932, secured on the Edmonds Build¬ 
ing, to give them an opportunity to arrange loans authorized 
bv the said decree. 

In order to pay off said $25,000 notes (extended to March 
27,1932) and to meet the obligations due and to become due, 
the best terms obtainable by your petitioners, which they 
considered to the best interests to the estate to accept, and 
therefore did accept and enter into, were as follows: The 
said petitioners did make and execute their deed of trust 
dated February 9, 1932, recorded February 15, 1932, secur¬ 
ing Edward A. King in the sum of $125,000 represented by 
notes of equal amount payable “on or before five years after 
date”, which said notes were secured bv the said deed of 
trust on the Grafton Hotel property owned by the said es¬ 
tate. The said Edward A. King endorsed said notes “with¬ 
out recourse” to your petitioners, who deposited them as 
collateral with the National Savings & Trust Company 
under an agreement that the said Trust Company would 
loan to your petitioners, during the years 1932 and 1933, 
on collateral demand notes, secured by the said real estate 
notes “such sums as the necessities of the Andrews Estate 
may required, not to exceed the sum of $100,000.00, and 




M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 25 


charge interest thereon only from the dates of the 

32 partial loans. 

That thereafter your petitioners borrowed from 
the said National Savings & Trust Company on their de- 
mand notes payable to the said Trust Company, in accord¬ 
ance with the said agreement, $36,000 and have pai d off the 
said $25,000 of notes extended to March 27, 1932, as shown 
by the Account hereto attached. 

11. Your petitioners have hereto annexed and marked 
“Exhibit F”, and prayed to be read as part hereof, their 
Capital Account from January 1, 1932, to April 1st, 1932, 
which shows the disposition made of the moneys borrowed 
from the National Savings & Trust Company, including a 
statement of the expenses of this proceeding, and “Exhibit 
G”, their Income Account from January 1, 1932, to April 
1st, 1932, which they pray may be read as part of this 
petition, and the said petitioners are prepared to support 
the said accounts by vouchers and cancelled cheeky. 

12. Due to the fact that all the real estate belonging to 
this estate was in the City of Washington, and tiat Paul 
A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, two of the three Trus¬ 
tees under said Will, were non-residents of the District of 
Columbia, an agreement for the more effective manage¬ 
ment of said Estate, dated December 24, 1914, was entered 
into bv and between the said Paul A. Andrews and Walter 
S. Andrews, each in his own right as devisee under the 
said Will, and jointly as surviving Trustees thereunder, 
and the said Reginald S. Huidekoper, as Substituted Trus¬ 
tee under said Will, whereby the latter should, Amongst 
other things, collect rents, discharge obligations, Heep the 
accounts of the said Estate, and in return for such services 

the said Reginald S. Huidekoper should deduct 

33 quarterly 3 per cent of the total gross receipts of 
said Estate and retain said amount as his Commis- 

mission for services as Managing Co-Trustee. 

The said agreement was amended by agreement dated 
May 21, 1917, between the said life tenants and the said 
Reginald S. Huidekoper as Co-Trustee, fixing the latter’s 
commission as Trustee at 5 per cent (instead of 3 p^r cent) 
of the gross receipts of said Estate, to be deducted quar¬ 
terly from the funds in his possession. A similar piovision 
was contained in an agreement dated April 3, 1929, between 
Walter S. Andrews in his own right as devisee under said 
Will, and as Trustee, Morgan Belmont, as Substituted 



26 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


Trustee, and the said Reginald S. Huidekoper, as Substi¬ 
tuted Trustee. 

Wherefore, your petitioners pray: 

1. That a Rule to Show Cause may be issued to Frank 
W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. Andrews, 
Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews (to be 
served on Benjamin S. Minor, his attorney of record), and 
Margaret A. Belmont, a minor (to be served on her guar¬ 
dian ad litem\ F. Regis Xoel), the defendants herein, ac¬ 
companied by a copy of this petition and the Account here¬ 
with submitted, requiring said defendants, and each of 
them, to show cause why the prayers of this petition should 
not be granted and said Account accepted and continued 
without reference to the Auditor so as to save expense and 
delay; and in case of any objection being filed to said Ac¬ 
count bv anv of said defendants, that same mav be re- 
ferred to the Auditor for appropriate action; 

2. That the Account herewith submitted be accepted and 
confirmed as the Account of the petitioners Walter S. An¬ 
drews and Reginald S. Huidekoper, as trustee and sub¬ 
stituted trustee, respectively, of the Estate of Frank 

.‘14 W. Andrews, deceased, for the period from Decem¬ 
ber 1, 1914, to April 1st, 1932, and as the Account 
of Morgan Belmont, substituted Trustee of the said Estate, 
from the date of his appointment, viz., January 14, 1929, 
to April 1st, 1932; 

3. That the Trustees of the said Estate be authorized to 
make report annually under Rule 69 of this Honorable 
Court in this Equity Cause Xo. 53,738 and that they be 
hence relieved from making report under said Rule 69 in 
Equity Cause Xo. 31656; 

4. That jurisdiction of this cause may be retained for 
such further orders and instructions regarding the admin¬ 
istration of the trust estate as mav be deemed necessarv 
upon application of anv of the parties to this cause. 

! WALTER S. AXDREWS, 

REGIXALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 
MORGAX BELMOXT, 

Trustees of the Estate of Frank 

W. Andrews , Deceased. 

McKEXXEY, FLAXXERY & CRAIGHILL, 

Bv J. S. FLAXXERY, 

Attorneys for Petitioners. 



27 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

District of Columbia, ss : 

I, Reginald S. Huidekoper, do solemnly swear that I have 
read the foregoing petition by me subscribed in the ca¬ 
pacity above indicated and I know the contents j thereof; 
that the facts stated upon my personal knowledge are true 
and those stated upon information and belief, I believe to 
be true. 

REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 day or March, 
1932. 

[notarial SEAL.] PHYLLIS 0. BURTNER, 

Notary Public, D. S. 

35 Decree Approving Account of Trustees. 

Filed May 26, 1932. 

##*###• 

This cause coming on to be heard upon the Petition and 
Report and the Supplemental Petition and Report of 
Walter S. Andrews, surviving Testamentary Trustee, and 
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, substituted 
Trustees, of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, 
filed herein on April 8th and May 26th, 1932, the Rule to 
Show Cause issued on April 8th, 1932, and the Answers 
thereto of Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John 
K. C. Andrew’s, Margaret Andrews Belmont and paul A. 
Andrew’s, and the Answer and Report of F. Regjs Noel, 
Guardian ad Titan for the defendant, Margaret A. Belmont, 
a minor, the only persons interested in said estate ^nd the 
questions raised by said Petition and Report and Supple¬ 
mental Petition and Report, and it appearing to th^ Court 
that said adult beneficiaries, by their said answers, consent 
to the granting of the prayers of said Petition and the ap¬ 
proving of the Account therewith submitted, and it further 
appearing to the Court that said Account has been audited 
by the Guardian ad litem and that lie recommends [the ap¬ 
proval thereof, and it further appearing to the Cou^t from 
said Supplemental Petition and Report that the errors in 
said Account disclosed by the audit of the Guardian ad 
litem have been corrected, it is, by the Court, this 2^th day 
of May, 1932, adjudged, ordered and decreed: 



28 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


1. That the Account of the Trustees filed herein on April 
8th, 1932, be and the same hereby is accepted and con¬ 
firmed as the Account of Walter S. Andrews and Reginald 
S. Huidekoper, Trustee and substituted Trustee, respec¬ 
tively, of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, 

36 for the period from December 1, 1914, to April 1, 
1932, and as the Account of Morgan Belmont, substi¬ 
tuted Trustee of the said Estate, from the date of his ap¬ 
pointment, January 14,1929, to April 1,1932; 

2. That the said Trustees be and thev herebv are author- 
ized to make report annually under Rule 69 of this Honor¬ 
able Court in this Equity Cause Xo. 53,738 and that they 
be and they hereby are relieved from making report under 
said Rule 69 in Equity Cause No. 31,656; 

3. That jurisdiction of this cause be retained for such 
further orders and instructions regarding the administra¬ 
tion of the trust estate as may be deemed necessary upon 
application of any of the parties to this cause. 

JESSE C. ADKINS, 

Justice . 

No objection. 

F. REGIS NOEL, 

Quar/fian ad Lit cm for Margaret A. Belmont. 
BENJ. S. MINOR, 

Atty. for Paul A. Andrews. 

Supplemental Petition of Trustees for I)istructions. 

Filed Aug. 15, 1932. 

#*####* 


The petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huide¬ 
koper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees of the Estate of 
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, respectfully represents to the 
Court as follows: 

1. Heretofore, on to wit, December 1, 1931, your 
37 petitioner Walter S. Andrews, as Testamentary 
Trustee, and your petitioners Reginald S. Huide¬ 
koper and Morgan Belmont, as Substituted Trustees under 
the Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, filed their peti¬ 
tion against the defendants above named, which petition 
was entitled “Petition to Construe Will and Instruct Trus¬ 
tees”. Answers of all the adult defendants, and an an- 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


29 


swer and report of F. Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem of the 
minor defendant Margaret A. Belmont, having been filed, 
evidence taken and filed, this Honorable Court on tb wit the 
19th day of January 1932, entered its decree herein author¬ 
izing the said Trustees to borrow funds, in accordance with 
the terms and to effect the objects of said said decree, 
which amongst other things, expressly provided as fol¬ 
lows : 

“III. It appearing from the evidence that the sum of 
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred and Eightv-two Dol- 

V O V 

lars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the income 

of the estate and used for capital expenditures, the Trustees 

are herebv authorized and directed to reimburse and re- 
•/ 

store to income said amount and to make the necessarv ad- 
justment and charges against capital in their accounts to be 
hereafter submitted to the Court, and when the said amount 
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life 
tenants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to each beneficiary. * ’ 

“VIII. In amplification of the powers contained in the 
Will of said decedent and of the additional powers given 
by this decree, said Trustees are hereby authorised and 
empowered to make, execute and deliver such contracts, 
guarantees, assignments, promissory notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust, deeds and/or other instruments of convey¬ 
ance or title as may be requisite, without obligatiorj on the 
part of the mortgagee or transferee to see to the Applica¬ 
tion of the money paid or loaned.” 

“XI. Jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retailed for 
such further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trus¬ 
tees or any other party to the cause may deem necessary 
or the necessities of the case may require.” 

2. Thereafter, on, to wit, April 8, 1932, your petitioners 
filed herein their “Petition and Report of Trustees”, 
38 stating their account as Trustees from December 1, 
1914, to April 1, 1932, which showed that Jail ex¬ 
penditures made by the Trustees of the said Estate, both 
on behalf of Capital and Income, had been approved as 
made by the beneficiaries then entitled to the incom|c from 
the said Estate, namely the petitioner Walter S. Andrews, 
and the defendant Paul A. Andrews, the only surviving 
children and sons of the said Testator, Frank W. Aiidrews. 
That the said “Petition and Report of Trustees” showed 



30 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


amongst other things, that your petitioners, as Trustees 
as aforesaid, had secured their promissory notes in the 
sum of $125,000.00 on certain real estate, which promis¬ 
sory notes they had deposited with a certain Trust Com¬ 
pany in the City of Washington, under the agreement with 
the said Trust Company that it would loan from time to 
time to the said Trustees, on demand notes executed by 
them and secured bv their said real estate notes, such 
amounts as they might require to meet the obligations of 
the said Estate, and to restore to Income from Capital for 
distribution quarterly, such amounts up to an amount fixed, 
as they should require pursuant to the said decree of Jan¬ 
uary 19, 1932. Thereafter, answers having been filed by 
the various defendants, including the defendant Paul A. 
Andrews, and F. Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem as afore¬ 
said, a decree! was entered herein, on, to wit, the 26th day 
of May, 1932, approving the said accounts of the said 
Trustees, your petitioners, herein, and retaining jurisdic¬ 
tion of this cause for such further instructions, orders and 
decrees as the Trustees or any other party to the cause 
may deem necessary or the necessities of the case may re¬ 
quire. 

3. The terms of borrowing, as above set forth, were the 
best your petitioners were able to secure, and by 
39 this method they are able to secure funds for this 
estate as required, without paying interest on idle 
money, which they would have been required to pay, if all 
funds authorized to be borrowed bv the decree of January 
19, 1932, had been borrowed in one lump sum. The first 
$10,000.00 was borrowed as aforesaid on February 17, 
1932, and of th*is amount $2,000.00 was restored to income 
and $1,000.00 distributed on the said date to the said Paul 
A. Andrews, and $1,000.00 distributed to the said Walter S. 
Andrews, pursuant to the said decree of January 19, 1932. 
A further sum of $2,000.00 was restored to Income and dis¬ 
tributed to the said beneficiaries, at the next quarter, viz., 
on May 17, 1932, pursuant to the said decree. An addi¬ 
tional $26,000.00 was borrowed on demand notes on March 
28, 1932, and of the amounts so borrowed there remains in 
the hands of your petitioners the sum of $1,926.35, the bal¬ 
ance of the funds borrowed having been used to meet obli¬ 
gations of the said Estate maturing and costs of this suit. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


31 


4. Your petitioners are informed and on such informa¬ 
tion aver that on or about, to wit, the 27th day of May, 1932, 
the defendant Paul A. Andrews died, leaving a papjer writ¬ 
ing termed a last Will and Testament, dated August 17, 
1930, a copy whereof is hereto annexed and marked “Ex¬ 
hibit A”, which is prayed to be read as part hereof. By the 
terms of the said paper writing the said Paul A. Andrews 
left his entire estate to his second wife, Muriel Abbott An¬ 
drews, and naming her as his Executrix. Your petitioners 
are further informed, and upon such information aVer, that 
proceedings have been instituted in the Probate Cjourt of 
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, for the probate of the said 

Will of Paul A. Andrews, and for the appointment 
40 of the said Muriel Abbott Andrews as Executrix 
thereof. 

5. Your petitioners further aver that the next quarterly 
date of restoration to income and distribution of $2,000.00 
pursuant to the third paragraph of the decree of January 
19, 1932, will be on August 17, 1932, and although your 
petitioners will have to borrow an additional amount be¬ 
fore then, they do not know to whom to pay the sljiare to 
which the said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled, 
if living. 

The said Muriel Abbott Andrews has claimed and has 
asserted that when she has qualified as Executrix of the 
Estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, she will claim the 
quarterly installments to be distributed under the third 


paragraph of the decree of January 19, 1932, to which the 
said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled, if living. 

The defendant herein, Margaret Andrews Belmont! is the 
only child of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and as 
such has claimed of your said petitioners and doth claim, 
that under the terms of the Will of the said Frahk W. 
Andrews, deceased, she alone is entitled after the! death 
of her father Paul A. Andrews, and during her lifetime 
and until final settlement of this Trust Estate, to oije-half 
of the income of the said Estate, including one-half bf the 
fund to be restored to Income and distributed aftbr the 
said Paul A. Andrews’ death under the terms of the third 
paragraph of the said decree of January 19, 1932. The 
pertinent provisions of the Will of the said Frank W. An¬ 
drews, deceased, Grandfather of the defendant Margaret 
Andrews Belmont, upon which she bases her claim, ire as 
follows: I 




32 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


41 61 Sixth. B. All the rest, residue and remainder of 

my hereinbefore described estate, I give, devise and 
bequeath in fee simple and absolutely, according to the 
nature of the property, to my two sons, Paul A. Andrews, 
of Newport, Rhode Island and Walter S. Andrews, of 
Middletown, in the State of Rhode Island, and to Oscar 
Luckett, of Washington, in the District of Columbia, in 
trust nevertheless, to and for the following uses, intents 
and purposes, viz., to hold, manage and direct the same 
during the lives of mv said two sons and the life of the 
survivor or longest liver of them, and upon the death of the 
survivor or longest liver of mv said two sons, mv Trustees 
shall convey in fee simple transfer and pay over said trust 
property as it shall then exist and free of any trust or con¬ 
dition to mv lawful issue then living, thev taking bv repre- 
sentation, according to the stocks; * * * and my Trus¬ 

tees shall dispose of the net rents and income of said trust 
property arising before the conveyance just directed, as 
follows: They shall pay the said net rents and income dur¬ 
ing the continuance of this trust by equal quarterly pay¬ 
ments in every year in equal shares to such of my said two 
sons as may be living at the time of payment and to the 
lawful issue then living of either of my said two sons who 
has then deceased (whether such mv son have died before 
or after me) such issue taking by representation accord¬ 
ing to the stocks the share which such my deceased son 
would have taken if living. * * * ” 

“Tenth. 1 direct that the income herein bequeathed shall 

not lie alienable bv anv beneficiarv either bv assignment or 

bv anv other method and the said income shall not be sub- 
* • 

ject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process 
whatsoever. * * *” 

“Thirteenth. The decisions of mv Trustees as to anv 
questions arising between capital and income shall be final 
and binding upon all persons then or thereafter inter¬ 
ested. * *” 

6. Your petitioners are not in doubt as to the rights of 
Walter S. Andrews, as beneficiary under the Will of the 
said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and under the decree 
of January 19, 1932, in reference to matters set forth in 
this petition, and his interest is not affected by the matters 
herein set forth. 


33 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

Of the defendants heretofore named in the original peti¬ 
tion and in the Accounting Report of the Trustees hereto¬ 
fore filed herein the defendants Frank W. Andrews, Wil¬ 
liam T. Andrews and John K. C. Andrews have nq interest 
in the income of this Trust Estate, and ar^ not en- 

42 titled to any part of the fund to be distributed under 
the third paragraph of the said decree of [January 

19,1932, so long as their father, Walter S. Andrew^ is alive 
and the said Walter S. Andrews is still alive. Similarly 
the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor, jand her 
Guardian ad litem , F. Regis Noel, has no such interest so 
long as her mother, the defendant Margaret Andrews Bel¬ 
mont is alive, and she is still alive. All petitions, orders, 
decrees, evidence and proceedings heretofore had and en¬ 
tered in this cause are prayed to be read as pari of this 
petition and the death of the said Paul A. Andrews is sug¬ 
gested. 

Wherefore the premises considered, your petitioners 
pray: 

I. That the death of the defendant heretofore nbmed in 
these proceedings, Paul A. Andrews, be recorded herein. 

II. That subpoena issue to the defendant Margaret An¬ 
drews Belmont, and to Muriel Abbott Andrews, as Execu¬ 
trix under the Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, to enter 
their appearance herein, answer this petition, and inter¬ 
plead their claims of rights. 

III. That a Rule to Show Cause issue to the defendant 
Margaret Andrews Belmont and to Muriel Abbbtt An¬ 
drews, as the person named as Executrix of the Will of the 
said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, requiring them tlo make 
answer to this petition under oath and interplead their 
claims to the fund referred to in the third paragraph of the 
decree passed herein on January 19, 1932, and that the said 
Executrix file a certified copy of the proceedings probating 
the Will of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and her 

qualification as Executrix thereof, provided*a copy 

43 of the said Rule to Show Cause together withj a copy 
of this petition be sent by registered mail to the last 

known address of the said defendant Margaret Aindrews 
Belmont, and to the said Muriel Abbott Andrews, in de¬ 
fault of their voluntary appearance. 


3—6025a 


34 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


IV. That the Court will enter its order or decree direct¬ 
ing the petitioners herein, and their successors as Trustees 
of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to whom they 
shall pay and distrubute quarterly that part of the fund re¬ 
ferred to in the third paragraph of the said decree of Janu¬ 
ary 19, 1932, to which the said Paul A. Andrews (now de¬ 
ceased) would have been entitled if living at the time future 
payments and distributions are to be made, and protecting 
the said Trustees in making such payments, or authorizing 
them to make said payments into the Registry of this Court. 

V. That jurisdiction of this cause be retained for such 
further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or 
anv other partv to the cause mav deem necessarv or the 
necessities of the case may require. 

VI. That thev mav have such other and further relief as 

* * 

the nature of the case mav require. 

WALTER S. ANDREWS, 
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 
MORGAN BELMONT, 

Trustees of the Estate of Frank 
IT. Andrews, Deceased, Petitioners. 

REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 

Attorney for Petitioners. 

Borough of Manhattan, 

State of New York, ss: 

I, Morgan Belmont, being first duly sworn, upon oath 
depose and say that 1 have read the foregoing and annexed 
petition by me subscribed and know the contents thereof 
and that the matters therein stated upon my own 
44 personal knowledge are true, and the matters af¬ 
firmatively stated therein on information and be¬ 
lief, 1 believe to be true. 

MORGAN BELMONT. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of 
August, 1932. 

" [notarial seal.] HARRY J. DIETRICH, 

i Notary Public, Westchester County. 

Cert, filed N. Y. County No. 14. 

N. Y. Countv Register No. 4D7. 

Commission expires March 30, 1934. 



I 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 35 

Exhibit “A”. 

Last Will and Testament of Paul A. Andrews. 

i 

I, Paul Adams Andrews, of the Borough of Manhattan, 
City, County and State of New York, do hereby njake this 
as and to be my last will and testament hereby revoking all 
former wills and codicils by me at any time heretofore 
made. 

First. I authorize my Executrix, hereinafter named, to 
pay all my just debts and funeral expenses as soon after 
my decease as may be convenient. 

Second. (A) I give, devise and bequeath unto my be¬ 
loved wife, Muriel Abbott Andrews, all the rest, residue 
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal. 

(B) I make no bequest to my daughter, Margaret An¬ 
drews Belmont, her heirs, successors or assigns oif to any 
children which may be born to me in lawful wedlock in the 
future or their heirs, successors or assigns as they have 
been provided for otherwise. 

Third. I nominate, constitute and appoint the said Muriel 
Abbott Andrews to be the Sole Executris of this, jny last 
will and testament, and hereby provide that she be 
45 required to furnish no bond or other security in the 
premises. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand ^rid seal 
the 17 dav of August, 1930. I 

(Signed) " PAUL A. ANDREWS. 

Witnesses: j 

(Signed) JOHN W. HEATH. 

(Signed) FRANCIS HAMILTON. 

Signed, sealed, published and declared to be Ids last will 

and testament in the presence of us, who, at his Request 

and in his presence and in the presence of each oth^r have 

hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses the ddy and 

vear above written. 

* 

i 

Ansicer and Return of Margaret Andrews Belmont. 

Filed Oct. 15, 1932. 

******* 

Now comes respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, and 
for answer to the supplemental petition of the Tiiustees 


36 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


filed in this cause on August 15, 1932, and as a return to 
the rule to show cause issued thereon, shows as follows: 

1. This respondent admits, for the purpose of this pro¬ 
ceeding, all of the allegations contained in paragraph One 
(1) of the said supplemental petition, but respectfully re¬ 
fers to the decree herein of January 19, 1932, for greater 
accuracy as to what is contained therein. 

90 

2. This respondent admits, for the purpose of this pro¬ 
ceeding, all of the allegations contained in paragraph Two 

(2) of the said supplemental petition, but respect- 
46 fully refers to the petition and report of the Trustees 
filed herein April 8, 1932, for greater accuracy as to 
what is contained therein. 

3. Answering paragraph Three (3) of said supplemental 
petition, this respondent admits that pursuant to para¬ 
graph III of the decree of January 19, 1932, there was paid 
to Paul A. Andrews on or about February 17, 1932, the 
sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000), and a further pay¬ 
ment of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) on or about May 
17, 1932. This respondent being without information or 
knowledge respecting the other allegations of said para¬ 
graph 3, neither admits nor denies the same. 

4. This respondent answering paragraph Four (4) of 
said supplemental petition, admits that on or about the 
27th day of May, 1932, Paul A. Andrews died leaving a 
paper writing termed a last wfill and testament dated Au¬ 
gust 17, 1930, a copy whereof is annexed to the supple¬ 
mental petition and marked Exhibit “A”. But having no 
information or knowledge regarding the other allegations 
of said paragraph Four (4), this respondent neither ad¬ 
mits nor denies the same. 

5. This respondent answering the allegations of para¬ 
graph Five (5) of said supplemental petition, admits all 
of the allegations thereof excepting those contained in the 
second paragraph relating to the claim of Muriel Abbott 
Andrews as Executrix of the estate of Paul A. Andrews, 
deceased, to the quarterly instalments of income to be dis¬ 
tributed under the third paragraph of the decree of Jan¬ 
uary 19, 1932, to which said Paul A. Andrews would have 
been entitled if living, and says with respect to those alle- 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


37 


gations that she does not have sufficient information or 
knowledge either to admit or deny the sam^. 

47 Further answering said paragraph Five (!j)) of the 
suplemental petition, this respondent admits as being 

correct the provisions of the will of Frank W. Andrews, 
deceased, set forth and quoted in said paragraph Five (5) 
of the supplemental petition, but for greater accujracy re¬ 
fers to the will itself as duly admitted to probate and record 
by this Honorable Court, holding Probate Court in admin¬ 
istration proceedings. 

6. With reference to the allegations and statements set 
forth in paragraph Six ((5) of said supplemental petition, 
this respondent is advised by counsel that she is not re¬ 
quired to make answer to the same. 

Further answering said supplemental petition and the 
rule to show cause issued thereon, this respondent says that 
she is the only child of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and by 
virtue thereof upon his death she became entitled under 
the will of said Frank W. Andrews, as appears from the 
record herein, to one-half of all income accrued in i;he said 
Estate not actually paid over and distributed to her father, 
said Paul A. Andrews, during his lifetime, including one- 
half of the fund referred to in the said supplemental pe¬ 
tition as the fund ordered by this Honorable Coutt to be 
restored to the Income Account, the share thereof payable 
to her amounting to, to-wit, $14,491.03. 

And having fully answered, this respondent pr^ys that 
a further decree may be entered herein ordering and in¬ 
structing Petitioners, Trustees under the will of Frank W. 
Andrews, deceased, to pay over to her the said feum of 
$14,491.03, as well as other income accrued in favor of her 
father, said Paul A. Andrews, in his lifetime, but not actu¬ 
ally paid over and distributed to him prior to his death; 
and that she be hence dismissed with her reasonable 

48 costs 

MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT. 

I 

FROST, MYERS & TOWERS, 

By FRANK H. MYERS, 

Attorneys for Respondent 

Margaret Andrews Belmont. 



38 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


State of New York, 

Comity of New York, ss: 

Margaret Andrews Belmont, being first duly sworn, on 
oath deposes and says that she has read the foregoing an¬ 
swer and return by her subscribed and knows the contents 
thereof; that the matters and things therein stated are 
true, and those stated upon information and belief she be¬ 
lieves to be true. 

MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of Oc¬ 
tober, A. D.1932. 

[notarial seal.] HARRY J. DIETRICH, 

, Notary Public , Westchester County. 

Cert, filed N. Y. County No. 14. 

N. Y. Countv Register No. 4D7. 

Commission expires March 30, 1934. 

Last Will of Frank W. Andrews. 

Filed Jun. 27, 1933. 

Be it remembered, that I, Frank W. Andrews, of Middle- 
town, in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Planta¬ 
tions, do make mv last will thus, hereby revoking all 
fromer will- bv me at anv time made: 

First. I hereby direct my executors to pay to the Pro¬ 
prietors of tlie Cemetery of Mount Auburn in Cambridge, 
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts such sum of money 
as mav be found necessary to obtain from said cor- 
49 poration a contract for the perpetual repair with 

guaranty of my lot numbered 3755 on the way called 
“Clematis” in said Cemeterv including the care of the 
monument and headstones on and curbing around said lot, 
but not including the renewal thereof; 

Second. And 1 hereby authorize and empower my execu¬ 
tors to rc-convey my said lot in trust, to the Proprietors of 
the Cemetery of Mount Auburn, in consideration of the 
contract of perpetual repair for the purpose of securing it 
as a burial place for myself, my wife and my sons and 
their wives and mv sons’ children; for mv sister, Elizabeth 
W. Clark and her issue and their husbands and wives and 
no other interments to be allowed therein; 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


39 


fiving at 
and be¬ 
st living 


Third. I give and bequeath to my son, Walter S. An¬ 
drews, if he shall survive me, my watch and seal until my 
grandson, Frank W. Andrews 2nd, shall arrive at the age 
of twenty one years, and then I give and bequeath the said 
watch and seal to my said grandson: 

If the said Walter shall die before mv said grandson 
arrives at the age of twenty one years, then upon the hap¬ 
pening of that event, or, upon the death of the said Wal¬ 
ter in mv life-time, I give the said watch and segl to the 
Trustees then acting under this will or to the persons who 
last acted as Trustees under this will to hold until my said 
grandson arrives at the age of twenty-one years, or dies, 
which ever event shall first occur, and if and when mv said 
grandson arrives at the age of twenty one years to deliver 
said watch and seal to my said grandson which shall then 
become his absolute property: 

If mv said grandson shall die before aril 
50 the age of twenty-one years, I then give 
queath the said watch and seal to my then oldej 
male issue: 

Fourth. I give and devise to my said wife, Marik F. An¬ 
drews, if she survives me, the parcel of land in Boston in 
the County of Suffolk and Commonwealth of Massachu¬ 
setts with the dwelling house thereon, now numbered 187 
on Beacon Street to have and to hold the same to her and 
her heirs and assigns forever: 

Fifth. I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Maria F. 
Andrews, for and during the term of her natural life, the 
use and income of all the rest and residue of my estate, real 
and personal, wheresoever the same may be sitfiate and 
whensoever acquired by me, of which I shall die seized and 
possessed, or in which I may have any interest, llegal or 
equitable, and to which I shall be in any way entitled at 
the time of mv decease, and over which I now or nkav then 
have any power of appointment; and I direct that|said in¬ 
come shall not be alienable by my said wife, nor sjhall the 
same be liable for her debts, nor shall she have y^ower to 
sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate her life |interest 
therein. I further direct that out of said income mv said 
wife shall pay and discharge all municipal claims and all 
lawful taxes, general and special, made, levied or Assessed 
against any of my said real estate, the interest on kny and 
all debts secured by any lien upon any of my skid real 




40 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


estate, the cost of maintaining proper insurance upon the 
improvements on said real estate against loss by fire, in¬ 
cluding boiler insurance, and the expense of keeping said 
improvements in a good state of repair: 

51 Sixth. At the decease of my said wife or at my de¬ 
cease, if I shall survive her 

A. I give the use of all mv familv portraits, coats of 

B H 

arms and family bibles and silver tankard mark 0 to my 
then oldest living son, during his life, and at his death I 
give the same to his then oldest living son, but if he shall 
leave no son surviving him, I give the same to my then 
oldest living male descendant: and I direct that all the 
rest of my furniture, linen, plate silver, bronzes, bric-a- 
brac, china, glass, books, prints, pictures, wines, liquors, 
fuel, consumable provisions and other household effects and 
jewelry, except the watch and seal herinbefore bequeathed, 
also all my brasses, live-stock, carriages, harnesses and 
other appendages belonging thereto; also all gardening im¬ 
plements, stock of hay, corn and straw and other movable 
effects which shall be used in or about my stable or grounds 
at the time of my decease be appraised and then offered 
at private auction to my two sons and to the issue of any 
son who has then deceased and the balance of said articles 
which are not sold to either of mv said sons or to the issue 
of any deceased son are to be sold and all the proceeds de¬ 
rived from the sale of said articles whether at the said 
private sale or otherwise, are to become a part of the 
residue of mv estate. 

V 

b. All the rest, residue and remainder of my herein¬ 
before described estate, I give, devise and bequeath in fee- 
simple and absolutely, according to the nature of the prop¬ 
erty, to my two sons, Paul A. Andrews of Newport, Rhode 
Island and Walter S. Andrews, of Middletown, in the State 
of Rhode Island, and to Oscar Luckett, of Washing- 

52 ton in the District of Columbia, in trust nevertheless, 
and to and for the following uses, intents and pur¬ 
poses viz: To hold, manage and direct the same during the 
lives of my sajd two sons and the life of the survivor or 
longest liver of them, and upon the death of the survivor 
or longest liver of my said two sons, my Trustees shall 
convey in fee-simple transfer and pay over said trust prop¬ 
erty as it shall then exist and free of any trust or condi- 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


41 


tion to my lawful issue then living, they taking by repre¬ 
sentation, according to the stocks; provided, however, that 
if upon the decease of the survivor or longest livet of my 
said two sons, there shall be no lawful issue of mine then 
living my trustees shall then convey in fee-simple, transfer 
and pay over said trust property as it shall then e^ist, and 
free of any trust or condition, to those persons whb are at 
that time my heirs by blood, and my trustees shall dispose 
of the net/ rents and income of said trust property arising 
before the conveyance just directed, as follows: Th\*y shall 
pay the said net/ rents and income during the continuance 
of this trust by equal quarter yearly payments in every 
year in equal shares to such of my said two sons jas may 
be living at the time of payment and to the lawful issue 
then living of either of my said two sons who has then de¬ 
ceased (whether such my son have died before or after 
me) such issue taking by representation according to the 
stocks the share which such my deceased son would have 
taken if living. | 

I have given no part of my said residuary estate free of 
trust to my children, for the reason that they will bel amply 
provided for from the fund coming to them under ijhe will 
of my father, William T. Andrews: 

Seventh. I hereby authorize and empower the 
53 trustees or trustee for the time being under this will, 
in their or his discretion to sell at public auction or 
private seal, or lease, any portion or the whole of my es¬ 
tate, real and personal, which they or he may hold under 
the trust created by this, will, and to execute and deliver 
good and sufficient deeds and other instruments to convey 
and transfer the same. And wherever it shall become 
necessary to make the final distribution of any property 
held in trust under this will, the trustees or trustee ffor the 
time being shall have like authority for the purpose df such 
distribution to sell and convert into money the whole or 
any portion of such property, whether real or personal; 
and I direct my trustees to re-invest the proceeds qf any 
real estate sold, in other productive real estate. 

Eighth. In case the number of Trustees under the residu¬ 
ary clause of this will shall be at any time reduced to two 
I then direct the surviving or remaining trustees fir the 
time being by any instrument or petition to nominate a 
suitable person to be appointed by the Judge of Probate 



42 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


for the time being having jurisdiction of this will or other 
court having the necessary jurisdiction in the premises, 
such trustee in the place of the trustee dying, resigning or 
ceasing or refusing for any cause to act; and in defaulf of 
such nomination and appointment the vacancy shall be 
filled in tlie manner provided by law: 

Ninth. I hereby authorize and empower my executors or 
executor or the administrator with this will annexed, if in 
performance! of the duties of the trust it becomes in their 
or his opinion necessary or expedient to sell at any time 
at public or private sale any part or all of my estate, real 
or personal and to execute and deliver proper and sufficient 
deeds and instruments to convev and transfer the same; 
and I further authorize and empower my said executors, 
executor or administrator to adjust by arbitration 
54 or compromise any demands in favor of or against 
my estate upon such terms as to them shall seem 
best and their decision shall be final. 

The wordsi “Trustees” or “Trustee” whereaver used in 
this will shall be construed and taken to mean the Trustees 
or Trustee for the time being whether original or substi- 
tuted; and the words “child”, “children” and “issue” shall 
be construed and taken to mean child, children and issue by 
blood and not by adoption. 

Tenth: I direct that the income herein bequeathed shall 

not be alienable bv anv beneficiarv either bv assignment or 

bv anv other method and the said income shall not be sub- 
* » 

ject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process what¬ 


ever : 

Eleventh: I appoint my said wife, Maria F. Andrews and 
my said sons, Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, and 
the said Oscar Luckett, Executors of this mv will and I 
request that they and each of them be exempt from giving 
anv bond, or bonds, anv suretv or sureties on their bonds 
both as Executors hereof and Trustees hereunder: 


Twelfth: If anv Executor or trustee herein named de- 

mt 

dines to accept or for any reason fails or ceases to act as 
such, it shall not deprive him or her of any legacy or device 
herein or bv anv codiciul given to him or her or for his or 
her benefit: 


Thirteenth: The decision of my trustees as to any ques¬ 
tion arising between capital and income shall be final and 
binding on all persons then or thereafter interested: 


43 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. j 

I 

The provisions hereinbefore made for my said wife are 
in lieu of all rights of dower or other interest ip my said 
estate: 

Fourteenth: I direct my Executors to p^y the ex- 

55 pcnse of the distribution of the furniture other 
like articles out of the residue of my estate!: 

Fifteenth: I hereby expressly relieve any purchaser or 
purchasers at any sale made by the Trustees or Executors 
under this my will from any and all obligation of feeing to 
the proper application of the purchase money arising from 
any such sale; 

In witness whereof, I, the said Frank W. Andrews, hereto 
set my hand and seal to this my will written on sev^n pages 
and this portion of an eighth page, this twenty-fifth day 
of September, nineteen hundred and two. 

FRANK W. ANDREWS, (seal). 

Signed, Sealed, Published and Declared by tlie above 
named Frank W. Andrews, as and for his last will in our 
presence, who at his request, in his presence, and in the 
presence of each other have hereunto subscribed our names 
as witnesses. 

ADDISON THOMAS, 

Neivporti R. I. 

MARY E. WARDWELfj, 

Newport, R. I. 
AUSTIN FLINT, Jr., 

34 East 54 th St., New York, N. Y. 

Memorandum of Court. 

Filed January 10, 1933 
******* 

The Court will enter an order directing the trustees of 
the estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to pay ^nd dis¬ 
tribute quarterly that part of the fund referred to in the 
third paragraph of the decree entered herein on the 19th 
day of January, 1932, and to which Paul A. Andrejvs, now 
deceased, would have been entitled to if living, to his 

56 daughter, Margaret Andrews Belmont. Counsel will 
please prepare proper decree. 

0. R. LUHRINGj, 

Justice. 



44 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews, for a Rehearing. 

Filed Januarv 19, 1933. 

7 

**•**•# 


Now conies the petitioner, by her attorneys, Minor, Gatley 
& Drury, and moves the Court to grant a rehearing on the 
plaintiffs' supplemental petition and the rule to show cause 
issued^ thereon because the finding by the Court in favor of 
respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, as shown by the 
memorandum of the Court filed herein, is not in accordance 
with the decree of this Court, passed herein on Januarv 19, 
1932. 

MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY, 

By BENJ. S. MINOR, 

Attorneys for Petitioner. 

Memorandum in Support of Petition for a Rehearing. 


With the exception of showing the source from which the 
two sons of the testator derived title to the various sums, 
aggregating $32,982.06, taken with their consent from in¬ 
come and used for capital expenditures, tlie decision of the 
Court on the question herein involved is neither dependent 
upon nor requires the construction of the will of the de¬ 
cedent, Frank W. Andrews; but solely upon the record 
herein on January 19, 1932. 

In the findings of fact bv the Court from the record in 
this cause, the Court, among other things, found that the 
aggregate sum of $32,982.06 had, from time to time, 
57 been taken in prior years from the income of the trust 
estate and used for capital expenditures. 

The various sums aggregating the sum of $32,982.06 so 
taken from income, were taken, with the consent of the bene¬ 
ficiaries then entitled thereto, in various years prior to the 
year in which the original bill in this cause was filed. And 
at the time or times when said income was so taken for capi- 
tal expenditures, and also at the date of the passage herein 
of the decree of January 19, 1932, Paul A. Andrews (now 
deceased), was one of the two life beneficiaries then entitled 
under sub-paragraph B of the last will and testament of 
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to one-half of the net income 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


45 


arising from the trust estate therein and thereby created, 
payable in the manner therein directed, including one-half 
of that part of the aggregate sum of $32,982.06 so taken 
from accrued income and used for capital expenditures. 

Under said sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixtfi of said 
last will and testament of Frank W Andrews, decelased, the 
trustees are directed by the testator to pay, during the con¬ 
tinuance of the trust therein created, the net rentals and 
income therefrom, “by equal quarter yearly payments in 
every year in equal shares to such of my said two sons as 
may be living at the time of payment and to the lavjful issue 
then living of either of my said two sons who has (then de¬ 
ceased, etc.” 

It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing quoted 
language is clear, unambiguous and requires no construc¬ 
tion. It directs the trustees in clear and unambiguous lan¬ 
guage to pay in every year in equal shares to his two sons, 
during the continuance of the trust, the income arising 
therefrom by equal quarter yearly payments. 

From said quoted provision of said will it is equally clear 
that the lawful issue of either deceased son of the 
58 testator was to receive the income accruing i|rom the 
trust estate after the death of such son, ijicluding 
only such of the equal quarter yearly installments of the an¬ 
nual income accruing during the year of and before the 
death of such son but not payable until after his depth; and 
not to income which had accrued and was payable in prior 
years. 

There is no language contained in the will which can be 
construed to give to the trustees, either directly pr indi¬ 
rectly, the power to accumulate the income annually accru¬ 
ing from the trust estate, or any part thereof; or any power 
to use the income or any part thereof for capital Expendi¬ 
tures. The specific direction of the testator is that] the in¬ 
come accruing from the trust estate should be paid over and 
distributed in every year by equal quarterly installments . 

Therefore, at the end of each fiscal or calendar year in 
the administration of the trust estate, the then beneficiaries 
were entitled to receive the net income which had Accrued 
during such year from the trust estate. For defaullf by the 
trustees in the payment and distribution thereof in accord¬ 
ance with said provisions of said will, the then beneficiaries 
could have maintained a suit for the recovery thereof. By 


46 


Mj A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


consenting from time to time to the use of a part of such 
income for capital expenditures, such beneficiaries did not 
thereby relinquish or extinguish their title thereto. On the 
contrary, we respectfully submit, such beneficiaries being 
entitled to have paid over to them the income so used for 
capital expenditures, became creditors of the trust estate 
to the extent of the sum or sums so taken from the income 
for that purpose. 

The decree passed in this cause on January 19, 1932, 
found from the evidence adduced that the sum of $32,982.06 
was taken from the income of the estate and used for capi¬ 
tal expenditures, and by paragraph III thereof au- 
59 thorized and directed the trustees to reimburse and 
restore said amount to income; and, when so re¬ 
stored, to distribute the same to the life tenants entitled 
thereto, in quarterly installments of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000) to each beneficiary—obviously meaning and intend¬ 
ing thereby the life tenants who were entitled to receive and 
have paid to them the accrued income from the trust estate 
at the time the same was so taken bv the trustees and used 
for capital expenditures. 

The fact that the decree directs the payment of the re¬ 
stored income “in quarterly installments of One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary”, is immaterial since 
the total sum directed to be restored to income is also 
directed to be paid to the life tenants entitled thereto. 

The payment thereof in quarterly installments of One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000) was due to the fact, as shown 
bv the record in this cause and bv said decree, that the 
trustees were not in position because of lack of funds to 
make immediate payment thereof in one sum. Had they 
been, we respectfully submit, the decree would not have 
provided for installment payments thereof. 

The decree of January 19, 1932, constitutes an adjudica¬ 
tion bv the Court of an indebtedness bv the trustees to the 
♦ * 

then life tenants growing out of the use by the trustees of 
income theretofore coming into their hands and used by 
them for capital expenditures. Ordinarily such adjudica¬ 
tion would have made that sum then payable to the life ten¬ 
ants according to their respective interests; but, for the 
purposes of administration and in the interest of the estate, 
instead of the decree directing it to be paid at once in a 
lump sum it directed the payment in installments as pro¬ 
vided in the decree. So that upon the death of Paul A. 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


47 


Andrews, one of the life tenants, there was ^till pay- 
60 able to him a balance of the sum so adjudicated to be 
due him by the Court in its decree. Such debt due 
and payable to him became and is an asset of his estate pay¬ 
able to his personal representatives. 

MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY, 

By BENJ. S. MINOR, 

Attorneys for Petiiioner. 

Answer of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and 
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, to Petition for Rehegring. 

Filed January 24, 1933. 


* 


!* 


Now comes Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper 
and Morgan Belmont, Trustee and Substituted trustees 
under the Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, py their 
attorney, Reginald S. Huidekoper, and for answer to the 
Petition for a Rehearing tiled herein, on to wit, January 19, 
1933, by Margaret Abbott Andrews, Executrix under the 
Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, prays that the Court 
will deny said Petition for a Rehearing, and enter its De¬ 
cree herein, for the reasons, amongst others, set opt in the 
Memorandum attached hereto and prayed to be t*ead as 
part hereof. 

REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 

Attorney for the Trustees. 


61 


i 

Answer of Margaret Andrews Belmont to petition 

for Rehearing. 


Filed January 24, 1933. 


L 


Comes now Margaret Andrews Belmont, by her 


neys, and for answer to the Petition for a Rehearing filed 
herein by Margaret Abbott Andrews, Executrix under the 
Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, says that such petition 
should be denied by the Court for the reasons stated in the 
attached Memorandum. 

FROST, MYERS, & TOWERS, 
Attorneys for Margaret Andrews Belinont. 


attor- 



48 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


Memorandum Opposing Petition for Rehearing. 

******* 

The petition for rehearing herein seeks to have this 
Court consider again a matter which was fully argued by 
counsel and decided by the Court after due deliberation; 
and nothing is contained in the Memorandum in support of 
said petition that was not argued at the oral hearing and, 
perforce, considered by the Court in its study of the case. 

In the first paragraph of said Memorandum it is stated 
that “the question herein involved is neither dependent 
upon nor requires the construction of the will of the de¬ 
cedent”. In other words, petitioner says that even though 
the testator meant literally what he in terms said in his 
will, namely, that his two sons were to have onlv such in- 
come as was actually paid into their hands, that would have 
nothing to do with the lawful disposition of the disputed 
monies, which although accumulated and accrued during 
the life of decedent, Paul W. Andrews, admittedly and cer¬ 
tainly were not paid over into his hand during his lifetime. 

We submit that the petition contains no substantial 
62 argument to support it, raises no point not raised at 

the oral argument, and merely seeks to impose on 
this Court tlie burden of hearing again arguments which it 
has already heard and to which counsel must assume it has 
given due and full consideration. 

Respectfullv submitted, 

FROST, MYERS & TOWERS, 

Attorneys for Respondent 
Margaret Andrew's Belmont. 

Opinion. 

Filed March 25, 1933. 

******* 

On the 1st day of December, 1931, the trustees herein filed 
their petitiop asking the Court to construe the will of Frank 
W. Andrews and to authorize and empower them to borrow 
money, encumber by mortgage or deed of trust any parcels 
of the real estate owned by the trust and to ratify and con¬ 
firm certain of their acts dealing with trust property. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


49 


a decree 
s of the 


Paul A. Andrews, a beneficiary of the trust, bjy his an¬ 
swer filed on the 14th day of December, 1931, consented to 
the granting of the prayers of the petition and to 
ratifying, confirming and approving all the act 
trustees. 

Upon consideration of this petition, my associate, Mr. 
Justice Adkins, on the 19th day of January, 1932, by decree 
authorized and directed the trustees, among other things, 
to restore to the income account funds taken ftfom that 
account and used for capital expenditures and to pay the 
amount thus restored to the beneficiaries as will more par¬ 
ticularly appear from Paragraph III of the decree as 
follows: 

63 “It appearing from the evidence that the sum of 
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two 
Dollars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken froifi the in¬ 
come of the estate and used for capital expenditures, the 
Trustees are hereby authorized and directed to reimburse 
and restore to income said amount and to make tlje neces¬ 
sary adjustment and charges against capital }n their 
accounts to be hereafter submitted to the Court, aiid when 
the said amount is restored to income, to distribute the 


same to the life tenants entitled thereto, in quart 
stallments of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) 
beneficiary.” 


erly in¬ 
to each 


* i 

This decree also authorized the trustees to borrow the 
sum of $350,000 “in such installments at such timers and at 
such rates of interest as they may consider for the best 
interest of the trust estate, and to secure the sam^ by the 
mortgage of any and/or all of the property of the trust 
estate”. The decree also approved and confirmed i;he acts 
of the trustees in making “the several sales, purchases, 
transfers and exchanges of various properties of tljie trust 
estate and the application of the proceeds of such sales and 
transfers as set forth in the evidence.” 

Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, the H 7 o sons 
of the testator, are the life tenants referred to in Paragraph 
III of this decree and are entitled to receive the income 
thus ordered restored. The income was restored, and, 
agreeably to the provisions of the decree, the trustees, on 


4—6025a 


50 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


the 17th days of February and May, 1932, made payments 
of $1,000 to each of the two beneficiaries, or a total of 
$4,000, on account of the income due them. 

Paul A. Andrews, one of the sons, died testate on the 
27th day of May, 1932, leaving him surviving a widow, 
Muriel Abbott Andrews, who is the executrix of his will, 
and a daughter, Margaret Andrews Belmont. By the terms 
of his will, he devised and bequeathed all of his estate, real 
and personal to the widow. 

64 On the 15th day of August, 1932, the trustees filed 
their supplemental petition for instructions, wherein 
it is alleged that Muriel Abbott Andrews has claimed and 
has asserted that when she lias qualified as executrix of the 
estate of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, she will claim 
the quarterly installments to be distributed under this third 
paragraph of the January 19th decree to which the said 
Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled if living; and 
that Margaret Andrews Belmont, the daughter of the de¬ 
ceased, has claimed and does claim that under the terms 
of the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, she alone is en¬ 
titled to the one-half of the fund ordered restored to income 
by this decree. 

The prayer is that the Court will enter its order or decree 
directing the trustees to whom they shall pay and dis¬ 
tribute quarterly that part of the fund referred to in the 
third paragraph of the decree of January 19th, 1932, to 
which Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled if living 
at the time further payments and distributions are to be 
made. 

Answers were duly filed to the petition and after a con¬ 
sideration of the question presented, this Court, on the 
10th dav of Januarv, 1933, bv a written memorandum, 
stated that a decree would be entered directing the trustees 
to pay and distribute quarterly that part of the fund re¬ 
ferred to in the third paragraph of the decree to Margaret 
Andrews Belmont. It is this ruling that is challenged by 
the petition for rehearing. 

The petition for rehearing was filed by Muriel Abbott 
Andrews, executrix of the will of Paul A. Andrews, de¬ 
ceased, on the 19th day of January, 1933. The trustees and 
Margaret Andrews Belmont oppose the petition, and writ¬ 
ten briefs in opposition have been filed by them. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 51 

The will of Frank W. Andrews, duly admitted to probate 
in this Court on the 8th day of July, 1903, made pro- 

65 vision for his widow, Maria F. Andrews. His widow 
died on the 22d day of November, 1931, and the trust 

with which we are here concerned became active oh the 1st 
day of December, 1914. 

It is to be noted at the outset that the will of Frank W. 
Andrews, deceased, required all funds derived f^om the 
sale of real estate by the trustees to be reinvested in other 
productive real estate. Because of this requirenjient the 
trustees of the estate have been unable to create capital 
cash fund with which to meet capital obligations, |such as 
payment of curtails and extensions of loans, capjtal bet¬ 
terments and charges. Such items were paid out of in¬ 
come with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. 
Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled to the net income from 
the estate. (See Report of Trustees filed April $, 1932.) 
Income to the extent of $32,982.06 was thus expended, as 
found by the Court in its decree of January 19tlf. 

The sixth paragraph of the will makes disposition of 
the estate after the death of the testator’s wife, providing 
with respect to the main residuary estate, that it ihall be 
held in trust for his two sons, Paul A. Andrews and'Walter 
S. Andrews, until the death of the survivor of th^m, and 
thereafter to the lawful issue of the testator. 'Jhe net 
rents and income of the trust property are disposed of in 
subdivision b of this paragraph of the will to the t\ko sons 
as follows: 

“My trustees shall dispose of the net rents and income of 
said trust property arising before the conveyance just di¬ 
rected, as follows: They shall pay the said net reitts and 
income during the continuance of this trust by equall quar¬ 
terly payments in every year in equal shares to such of my 
said two sons as may be living at the time of payment and 
to the lawful issue then living if either of my said two sons 
who has then deceased (whether such my son have died 
before or after me) such issue taking by representation 
according to the stocks the share which such my deceased 
son would have taken if living . 9 ’ 

The tenth and thirteenth paragraphs of tfye will 

66 are pertinent to the inquiry and read as follows: 


5—6025a 



52 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 

“ Tenth. I direct that the income here bequeathed shall 
not be alienable by anv beneficiary either bv assignment 
or by any other method and the said income shall not be 
subject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process 
whatever. ’ ’ 

“ Thirteenth. The decision of my trustees as to any ques¬ 
tion arising between capital and income shall be final and 
binding on all persons then or thereafter interested/’ 

It is obvious that the subdivision b of the sixth para¬ 
graph of the will creates a trust, and, in the language of 
Wilmot, C. J., “trusts are always imperative, and are ob¬ 
ligatory upon; the conscience of the party entrusted.” At¬ 
torney General v. Downing, Wilm. 23. No discretion was 
vested in the trustees. It was imperatively required that 
“they shall pay the net rents and income * * * by 

equal quarterly payments in every year in equal shares to 
such of my two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬ 
ment.” Income became due and payable during the life 
of the sons, and with their consent it was not paid in the 
manner directed, but was from time to time, with like con¬ 
sent of the sons, applied to capital expenditures. In other 
words, the trustees had the power to borrow money from 
any source for the purposes of the trust but they did not 
go through the idle form and ceremony of passing the 
actual cash to these beneficiaries and then receiving it from 
their hands as a loan to the estate. Certainly, in this con¬ 
nection, the Court may regard the substance rather than 
the form of the transaction. 

The thirteenth paragraph of the will gave the trustees 
no discretion in the matter of the payment of income once 
ascertained to be such. The record fails to disclose anv 
question arising between capital and income, requiring the 
decision of the trustees, and if there was such question it 
was resolved in favor of income. This Court, bv its decree 
of Januarv 19th, so treats it and so orders it distributed 
to the beneficiaries. 

67 The supplemental petition of the trustees for in¬ 
structions, filed on the 15th day of August, 1932, 
advises the Court that the trustees had arranged to borrow’ 
“such amounts as they might require to meet the obliga¬ 
tions of said estate, and to restore to income from capital 
for distribution quarterly such amounts up to an amount 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 53 

fixed, as they should require pursuant to the said ^lecree of 
January 19th, 1932,” and in paragraph three of such peti¬ 
tion it is alleged that “the first $10,000 was borrowed as 
aforesaid on February 17, 1932, and of this amount $2,000 
was restored to income and $1,000 was distributed on said 
date to the said Paul A. Andrews and $1,000 to the said 
Walter S. Andrews pursuant to the said decree of {January 
19th, 1932.” It is alleged that “a further sum cj>f $2,000 
was restored to income and distributed to the salid bene¬ 
ficiaries at the next quarter, viz., an May 17th, lt}32, pur¬ 
suant to the said decree.” 

As the net rents and income accrued, the trustees were 
required to pay it to the beneficiaries quarterly each year. 
Equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done. 
“For the purpose of reaching exact justice, equity (will fre¬ 
quently consider that property has assumed certain forms 
with which it ought, in justice, to be stamped, or that parties 
have performed certain duties which they ought, in justice, 
to fulfill; and will regulate the enjoyment and transmis¬ 
sion of estates and interests accordingly.” Bispham’s 
Equity (5th Ed.) 70-71. Viewed in the light of this maxim, 
the income was paid to the beneficiaries at the time it ought 
to have been paid, and became their property wholly apart 
from the trust. They were free to loan it to the trust. 

The tenth item of the will prohibited the assignment of 
the income by the beneficiaries and also prevented their 
creditors from taking it by any process whatever. This 
item did not deny the present enjoyment of the in- 
68 come bv the beneficiaries. Before it was earned, the 
beneficiaries could make no valid assignment of the 
income, nor could their creditors by attachment or execu¬ 
tion levy upon it. The income could not be diverted from 
its object. Nichols v. Platon, 91 U. S. 716; Spindle v. 
Shreve, 111 U. S. 542; Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 
133 Mass. 170; Pope’s Plxecutors v. Elliott, 8 B. Monroe 
(Ky.) 56. The will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, does not 
attempt to dispose of any of the trust estate, and it will 
not be contended in this connection that he did net have 
the right by will to dispose of the income paid to him in 
February and May, 1932, or any debt or obligation |due or 
owing to him at the time of his death. 

It is urged in the brief of the trustees that the construc¬ 
tion of the decree of January 19th contended for py the 



54 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


executrix would defeat the manifest intention of the testa¬ 
tor, Frank W. Andrews, in that it would extend the 
trust bevond the date fixed for its termination. The Court 

in its decree of January 19th ordered the amount due these 

•/ 

beneficiaries to be paid to them quarterly and in stated 
amounts. It had the power then to order and direct the 
immediate payment of the whole amount found to be due 
and even now mav modify its decree accordingly. 

Nor does the doctrine of estoppel urged by the trustees 
apply. The widow and executrix in asserting her claim 
does not repudiate the acts of Paul A. Andrews. So far 
as the record discloses, he regarded the sums so expended 
by the trustees as income properly belonging to him, other¬ 
wise there was no necessity for his consent to the ex- 
penditures. 

Finally let it be understood that the determination of 
* < 

the question here presented involves no criticism of the 
trustees in the management of this trust. On the contrary, 
thev are to be commended. 

69 Therefore, after careful reconsideration, I am of 

the opinion that the balance due on account of the 
restored income is payable to the estate of Paul A. An¬ 
drews, deceased, in the same manner as it would be payable 
to him if living. 

It is so ordered and counsel will prepare decree. 

0. R. LUHRING, 

Justice. 


Decree Instructing Trustees. 

Filed April 14, 1933. 

* * # # # # * 

This cause jcoming on to be heard upon the supplemental 
petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and 
Morgan Belmont, Trustees under the Will of Frank W. 
Andrews, deceased, filed herein on August 15, 193*2, the rule 
to show cause issued thereon and the answer and return 
thereto of Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the estate 
of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and Margaret Andrews 
Belmont, and the same having been fully argued by counsel 
and considered by the Court, it is this 14th day of April, 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 55 

1933, by the Court, adjudged, ordered and decreed as 
follows: 

1. That by paragraph III of the decree, passed herein 
on January 19, 1932, Paul A. Andrews (now deceased) be¬ 
came vested with the right, title and interest, and entitled 
to receive from the trustees of the estate of Frame W. An¬ 
drews, deceased, in the manner and at the times set forth 
in said decree, one-half of the sum of $32,982.06, being the 
amount taken from income in prior years by the| trustees 
of the trust estate created by the last will and testament 
of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, with the consent of the 

beneficiaries entitled thereto, and used for capital 
70 expenditures; and upon the death of the said Paul 
A. Andrews, the unpaid balance of said on!e-half of 
the said sum of $32,982.06, amounting to $14,491.0$, passed 
to, became vested in and payable to his estate in :he same 
manner and at the times as directed by said decree of Janu¬ 
ary 19 1932. 

* 7 

2. That out of the said unpaid balance of $14,491.03, and 
as and when the same is restored to income in accordance 
with the provisions of the said decree of January j.9, 1932, 
the said petitioners, Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. 
Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, trustees of the Estate 
of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and their successors in 
trust, are hereby instructed and directed to pay over and 
distribute to Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the 
Estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and to her successor 
representative of said estate, the quarterly installments 
which have heretofore accrued and become payable under 
and in accordance with the terms and provisions qf Para¬ 
graph III of the said Decree of January 19, 1932; and out 
of the balance of the remaining half of said fund, and as 
and when the same is restored to income, the said Trus¬ 
tees and their successors in trust, shall pay and distribute 
to the said Executrix, and to her successor representative 
as aforesaid, the quarterly installments hereafter to be¬ 
come due and payable in accordance with the ter^ns and 
conditions of said paragraph of said decree, and which 
the said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled to re¬ 
ceive had he lived. 

3. That jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retailed for 
such further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trus- 



56 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


tees or any other party to this cause may deem necessary, 
or the necessities of the case may require. 

Bv the Court: 

0. R. LUHRING, 

Justice. 

71 No objection as to form; but we reserve exception 
to entrance of this decree upon the ground that there 
is nothing before the court upon which a decree can be 
founded, the i last pleading being a motion for leave to 
re-argue. 

NORMAN B. FROST, 
Attorney for Margaret Andrews Belmont. 

The respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, in open 
Court, excepts to the signing of the foregoing decree and 
notes an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia, which is hereby allowed, and the bond 
or undertaking on appeal fixed in the sum of One Hundred 
Dollars ($100), and the bond or undertaking on appeal to 
act as supersedeas is hereby fixed at Four Thousand 
Dollars. 

Bv the Court. 

0. R. LUHRING, 

Justice. 

Memorandum. 

May 8, 1933.—Supersedeas Bond ($4,000) on appeal ap¬ 
proved and filed. 


Assignments of Error. 

Filed May 12,1933. 

• •••••* 

Comes now Margaret Andrews Belmont, appellant in the 
above-entitled cause, by her attorneys, and files this Assign¬ 
ment of the Errors upon which she will reply in the prose¬ 
cution of her appeal from the decree entered herein the 
14th day of April, 1933. 

The Court erred as follows, to wit: 

1. In reversing its decision of January 10th, 1933, 
72 wherein the accumulated interest fund in question 
was awarded to Margaret Andrew’s Belmont and 
entering the Decree of April 14th, 1933. 



M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


57 


2. In acting finally upon Muriel Abbott Andrew’s petition 
for a rehearing, without affording appellant an^ oppor¬ 
tunity to be heard thereon, and in entering a final decree 
reversing a previous order upon a petition which requested 
a rehearing only. 

3. In holding that the will of Frank W. Andrews author¬ 
ized and required the Trustees thereunder, by paragraph 6 
thereof, to pay over accrued income to persons other than 
the two sons of testator therein mentioned and their issue. 

4. In construing the will of Frank W. Andrews as an 
entirety to provide that income accrued during th(^ life of 
either of the beneficiaries thereunder, Paul A. Andrews and 
Walter S. Andrews, became their property prior t!o being 
actually paid over to them, and in thus holding flhat the 
Executrix of the Estate of Paul A. Andrews was entitled to 
certain income accrued during his lifetime but not actually 
paid over to him or specifically set aside for his benefit, as 
against the claim of the issue of said Paul A. Andrews. 

5. In failing to grant to appellant, Margaret Andrews 
Belmont, the relief prayed by her Answer filed in the pro¬ 
ceedings below. 

6. And for other errors appearing upon the facq of the 
record herein. 

FROST, MYERS & TOWERS, 

Attorneys for Appellant. 

I 

Service of a copy of the above Assignment of 
73 Errors acknowledged this 12th dav of Mav, 1933. 

MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY, 

Attorneys for Muriel Abbott Andrews , 
Executrix under the Will of Paul A. Andrews. 
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 

Attorney for Trustees, Walter S. Andrews\ 
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont. 

Designation of Record. 

Filed May 12,1933. 

******* 

Comes now appellant, Margaret Andrews Belmqnt, by 
her attorneys of record, and designates the following for 
inclusion in the transcript of record on appeal in the above- 
entitled cause: 



58 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 


1. Petition to construe will and instruct trustees, filed in 
this cause December 1, 1931. 

2. Decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Colum¬ 
bia, January 19, 1932. 

3. Petition and report of Trustees, stating account from 
December 1, 1914, to April 1, 1932. 

4. Decree of May 26, 1932. 

5. Supplemental petition of Trustees filed August 15, 

1932, with Exhibit “A” thereto. 

6. Answer and return of Margaret Andrews Belmont, 
filed October 15, 1932, to above petition. 

7. Will of Frank W. Andrews. 

8. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Luhring of January 10, 

1933, ordering Trustees to pay accumulated interest fund 
to Margaret Andrews Belmont. 

9. Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews, Executrix under 
the will of Paul A. Andrews, Deceased, for a rehearing. 

10. Answer of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. 
74 Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees, to peti¬ 
tion for rehearing.. 

11. Answer of Margaret Andrew’s Belmont to Petition 
for Rehearing. 

12. Opinion of Mr. Justice Luhring, entered on the Peti¬ 
tion for Rehearing, reversing former order and directing 
payment of accumulated fund to the Estate of Paul A. 
Andrew’s. 

13. Decree entered April 14, 1933, with note of appeal 
thereon, and not refixing supersedeas bond of $4,000. 

14. Note. of filing of supersedeas bond by respondent, 
Margaret Andrews Belmont. 

15. The assignments of error. 

16. This Designation. 

MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, 

By FROST, MYERS & TOWERS, 

Her Attorneys of Record. 

Service of a copy of the above Designation of Record is 
hereby acknowledged this 12th day of Mav, 1933. 

MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY, 

Attorneys for Muriel Abbott Andreivs, 
Executrix under the will of Paul A. Andrews. 

\ REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER, 

Attorney for Trustees, Walter S. Andrews, 
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont. 


M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. | 


59 


75 Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 

United States of America, 

District of Columbia, ss: 

I, Frank E. Cunningham, Clerk of the Supreme! Court of 
the District of Columbia, hereby certify the foregoing pages 
numbered from 1 to 74, both inclusive, to be a trub and cor¬ 
rect transcript of the record, according to directions of 
counsel, herein filed, copy of which is made part of this 
transcript, in cause No. 53738 in Equity, wherein ^Valter S. 
Andrews et al. are Petitioners and Frank W. Andrews et al. 
are Defendants, as the same remains upon the files and of 
record in said Court. 

In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my ifame and 
affix the seal of said Court, at the City of Washington, in 
said District, this 17th day of July, 1933. 

[Seal Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.] 

FRANK E. CUNNINGHAk, 

j Clerk. 

i 

Endorsed on cover: District of Columbia Supreme Court. 
No. 6025. Margaret Andrews Belmont, appellant, jvs. Wal¬ 
ter S. Andrews et al. Court of Appeals, District of Colum¬ 
bia. Filed Jul. 18, 1933. Henry W. Hodges, Cle|*k. 



Addition to Record per Stipulation of Counsel 


IN THE 

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 

No. 6025 


MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, APPELLANT, 

I 

VS. 

WALTER S. ANDREWS ET AL., APPELL 


Stipulation as to Filing Copy of Answer and Return of 
Muriel Abbott Andrews, Executrix. 

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and betweeii counsel 
for the parties to the above entitled appeal that thi answer 
and return of Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the 
estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, to the supplemental 
petition of the trustees filed in this cause on August |15,1932, 
a copy of which is hereto attached, may be filed, printed and 
constitute a part of the record on appeal herein. 

FROST, MYERS & | 
TOWERS, 

By NORMAN FROST, | 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Margaret Andrews Belmont . 

MINOR, GATLEY & 
DRURY, 

Attorneys for Appellee, 

Muriel Abbott Andrew 
Executrix of the Eslate 
of Paul A . Andrews, j^ec’d. 





o 


Filed Oct. 6,1932. 

In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Holding 

an Equity Court. 

Equity. No. 53738. 

Walter S. Andrews et al., Petitioners, 

vs. 

Frank W. Andrews et al., Defendants. 

Answer and Return of Muriel Abbott Andrew's , Executrix 
of the Estate of Paul A. Andrews , Deceased. 

This respondent, in answer to the supplemental petition 
of the trustees filed in this cause on August 15, 1932, and as 
return to the rule to show cause issued thereon, says: 

1. She admits for the purposes of this proceeding the 
allegations contained in paragraph 1 of said supplemental 
petition; but for greater accuracy refers to the decree itself, 
passed in this cause on January 19,1932, with respect to the 
provisions thereof. 

2. Respondent admits for the purposes of this proceeding 
the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of said supple¬ 
mental petition; but for greater accuracy refers to the peti¬ 
tion and report of the trustees filed herein on April 8, 1932, 
and to the decree in said paragraph referred to, with respect 
to the contents thereof. 

3. In answer to paragraph 3 of said supplemental peti¬ 
tion this respondent admits that, pursuant to paragraph III 
of the decree passed herein on January 19, 1932, there was 
paid by the trustees to Paul A. Andrews the sum of $1,000 
on or about February 17, 1932, and a like sum on or about 
May 17, 1932. With respect to the other matters and things 
alleged in said paragraph this respondent is without infor¬ 
mation or knowledge respecting the same. 

4. This respondent admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 4 of said supplemental petition. 

In connection with said paragraph this respondent files 
herewith, as Exhibits 1 and 2, a certified copy of the last 
will and testament of Paul Adams Andrews, which was duly 


admitted to probate and record on the 15th day of Septem¬ 
ber, A. D. 1932, by the Probate Court in and for the County 
of Suffolk, in the State of Massachusetts, and a certified 
copy of letters testamentary dated September 16, 1932, 
issued to respondent as the executrix named in said will, and 
which are prayed to be read and considered by the Court as 
a part of this paragraph. 

5. In answer to paragraph 5 of said supplemental peti¬ 
tion this respondent admits, that pursuant to paragraph III 
of the decree of January 19, 1932, the trustees were on, 
to-wit, August 17, 1932, directed to restore to income the 
sum of $2,000 and to distribute the same in accordance with 
tlie provisions thereof. 

Petitioner further admits that after the deatl} of said 
Paul A. Andrews, her husband, and prior to August 17, 
1932, she notified the said trustees of the provisions of the 
will of tlie said Paul A. Andrews, and by reason thereof 
respondent claimed and asserted, and now claims and as¬ 
serts, that as to one-half of the said sum of $2,000, which 
the said trustees were directed by paragraph III! of sfciid 
decree of January 19, 1932, to restore to capital on, to-wit, 
August 17, 1932, as well as with respect to one-half of any 
and all sums hereafter restored to income pursuant to said 
decree of January 19, 1932, the same is distributable and 
payable to petitioner as executrix of the estate of snid Paul 
A. Andrews, deceased. 

Further answering said paragraph this respondent for 
the purposes of this proceeding admits the provisions of 
the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, referred to and 
quoted in said paragraph 5 of said supplemental petition; 

was 

duly admitted to probate and record by this Honorable 
Court, holding a Probate Court. 

As to the other matters and things referred to in said 
paragraph 5 of said supplemental petition, this respondent 
is without knowledge or information concerning the same. 

6. As to the matters and things set forth in paragraph 6 
of said supplemental petition, this respondent is advised 
that she is not required to answer the same. 

7. Further answering said supplemental petition pid the 
rule to show cause issued thereon, this respondent sdys that 
the record in this cause establishes the fact, and this Hon- 


but for greater accuracy refers to the will itself which 


4 


orable Court £o found, that for a number of years prior to 
the death of Paul A. Andrews, the trustees under the will 
of Frank W. iAndrews, deceased, from time to time, took 
various sums from the net income of the trust estate, one- 
half of which was payable to said Paul A. Andrews, quarter- 
yearly in each and every year, and used and applied said 
sums for capital expenditures; and that by reason thereof 
this Honorable Court on January 19, 1932, authorized and 
directed the petitioners herein as trustees to reimburse and 
restore to income the sum of $32,982.06 which the Court 
found to have been taken from income as aforesaid, and to 
distribute the same to the life tenants entitled thereto, in 
quarterly installments of $1,000 to each beneficiary. 

That under| sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of the 
said las! will and testament of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, 
the testator, after the death of his wife, or at his death 
should she not survive him, and after compliance with the 
provisions of sub-paragraph A thereof, gave, devised and 
bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate 
in trust, for the use and purposes therein stated, and, among 
others, to pay the net rents and income during the contin¬ 
uance of the trust by equal quarterly yearly payments in 
every year in equal shares to such of his said two sons, viz, 
Paul A. Andrews and Walter Andrews, as mav be living at 
the time of payment. 

Petitioner further shows unto the Court that the record 
in this cause establishes the fact that all of such sums taken 
from income and used and applied for capital expenditures 
were taken from the net income which had accrued from 
said trust estate, and which said net income was, under the 
provisions of said will of the said Frank A. Andrews, pay¬ 
able by equal quarterly yearly payments in every year in- 
equal shares to his said tiro sons. By reason thereof such 
sums so taken from income and used for capital expendi¬ 
tures created a debt or an obligation of the trust estate in 
favor of the beneficiaries who were entitled, at the time the 
same accrued,; to receive said net income in everv vear bv 
equal quarterly installments; and such debt or obligation 
of the trust estate passed to the estate of anv beneficiarv 
thereof dying before the full payment thereof. 

Further answering this respondent says that by the lan¬ 
guage of paragraph III of the decree passed herein on Jan- 


5 


nary 19, 1932, it is obvious that the Court intended that the 
payments therein directed to be made to the “life tenants 
'entitled thereto” were the life tenants then living, and who 
were the beneficiaries entitled to said income When the 
same was used and applied for capital expenditures. 

Further answering said supplemental petition ! this re¬ 
spondent alleges that at the time of the death of siid Paul 
A. Andrews, he was, pursuant to the adjudication ar|d deter¬ 
mination of this Court as aforesaid, entitled to receive of 
and from the said trustees the sum of $14,491.03 (b^ing the 
balance of his share of the net income theretofore payable 
to him under the terms and provisions of the will o^ Frank 
W. Andrews, deceased), used by the trustees of the estate 
of said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, for capital Expendi¬ 
tures, which said sum is payable in accordance with the 
terms and provisions of said decree of January 19, 1932; 
and that upon the death of the said Paul A. Andrews the 
said sum of $14,491.03 so entitled to be received by him be¬ 
came and now is an asset of his estate, and is payable to 
this respondent as executrix under his will more particu¬ 
larly referred to in paragraph 4 of this answer. 

And now having fully answered, this respondent prays 
to be hence dismissed with her reasonable costs. 

MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS, 

Executrix of the Estate of 
Paul A. Andrews, Deceased. 
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY, 

By BENJ. S. MINOR, 

Attorneys for Respondent, 

312 Colorado Building. 

State of Massachusetts, 

County of Suffolk, To wit: 

Muriel Abbott Andrews, being first duly sworn according 
to law, upon oath deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing answer and return by her subscribed and knows 
the contents thereof; that the matters and things therein 
stated upon her personal knowledge are true, and those 
things stated upon information and belief she belibves to 
be true. 

MURIEL ABBOTT ANDRE|WS. 


6 


Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of Sep¬ 
tember, A. D. 1932. 

[seal.] DANIEL J. TRIGGS, 

Notary Public. 

[Endorsed;] No. 6025. Margaret Andrews Belmont, Ap¬ 
pellant, vs. Walter S. Andrews et al. Addition to record per 
stipulation of counsel. Court of Appeals, District of Colum¬ 
bia. Filed Oct. 25, 1933. Henry W. Hodges, Clerk. 


(4097) 




"ft KR. JJ7STT0B BOHE O 

DISTRICT Or COLUMEJ/ 


JF A^iF£:/Y_r 


A 


~ ; ? 


^■T 51323 


j ^ ^ 

VfT&A/J /iT s - 

/ ' 


CLERK 


IN THE 


Court of gppeate, district of Columbia 


No. 6025. 


Margaret Andrews Belmont, 

Appellant , 

vs. 

Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, 
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, et al. 


BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT. 


Norman B. Frost, 

Frank S. Myers, 

Frederic N. Towers, 

Counsel for Appellant. 


Psess or By eox S. Adams, Washington, D. 0. 







INDEX. 

Page 

Question Presented. 1,2 

Facts, and Proceedings Below. 2, 6 

Assignment of Errors . 6, 7 

Argument. 7 

1. Pertinent Provisions of the Will.7,8 

2. Applicable Rules of Construction.....8,14 

3. Case of Lombard v. Witbeck..15,18 

4. The Decree of January 19th, 1932, did not 

Vest anv Interest in the Fund.18,19 

5. Any Doubt should be Resolved in Favor of 

Appellant. 19 

Conclusion .. 20 

TABLE OF CASES. 

Cruit v. Owen, 25 App. D. C. 514. 13 

DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 3 App. D. C. 53. 13 

Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 111. 396; 51 X. E. 61... 15 

Mayo v. Weeden, 47 App. D. C. 138. 13 

Sherman v. American Security & Trust Co., 57 

App. D. C. 273 . 19 

Wright v. Denn, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 204, 239.. 13 















IN THE 

Court of Appeals, district of Columbia 

l 

i 

_ ! 

I 

No. 6025. 


Margaret Andrews Belmont, 
Appellant , 

vs. 

Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, 
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, et al. 

APPELLANT’S BRIEF. 


QUESTION PRESENTED. 

This appeal from the lower court’s decree raises tlie 
question as to whether a one-half share in certajin 
funds in the hands of testamentary trustees should \)e 
paid by them to the estate of a deceased life beneficiary 
under a residuum clause of his will, as being mon^y 
the right and title to which had vested in him during 
his lifetime; or, by the terms of the instrument cre¬ 
ating the trust—which provides that income shall be 
disbursed by quarterly payments to such of testator ’s 





2 


sons “as may be living at the time of payment, and to 
the lawful issue then living of either of said sons who 
has then deceased”—should be payable to deceased’s 
beneficiary’s only daughter, apjoellant. 

FACTS, AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 

The will of Frank W. Andrews, bearing date Sep¬ 
tember 25th, 1902, was admitted to probate and record 
in this District July 8th, 1903. Bv the terms thereof 
the remainder of testator’s property was given to 
his widow for life and at her death to trustees to hold, 
manage, etc., until the death of the survivor of tes¬ 
tator’s two sons, Paul A. and Walter S. Andrews, at 
which time it was to be distributed to testator’s issue. 
The direction to the trustees regarding payment of 
income during the life of the trust was as follows: 

“They shall pay the said nett rents and income 
during the continuance of this trust by equal quar¬ 
ter vearlv pavments in everv vear in equal shares 
to such of mv said two sons as mav be living at 
the time of payment and to the lawful issue then 
living of either of mv said two sons who has then 
deceased.” 

On December 1st, 1931, the trustees filed a petition 
on the equity side of the court below praying that the 
will be construed, that they be authorized to borrow 
monev on real estate owned bv the trust estate, and that 
certain of their acts as trustees during the preceding 
seventeen years be ratified and confirmed (R. p. 2). 

The chief purpose of this proceeding was to ob¬ 
tain authority to pledge real estate for loans, but it 
appeared incidentally that in order to administer the 
trust, the terms of which compelled them to keep all 
assets in real estate, the trustees had from time to 



3 


time used for capital purposes rents that properly 
should have been credited on the income side of the 
ledger (and at other times had disbursed capital as 
income). In their annual accounts the trustees had 
always fully disclosed the use of such rents, andjhad 
each year obtained the written consent and approval of 
such accounts from the two life beneficiaries (R. p. 
22). In entering its decree upon this petition (Janu¬ 
ary 19, 1932; R. p. 1G) the Court by Paragraph III 
thereof provided as follows: 

“It appearing from the evidence that the ium 
of Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty- 
two Dollars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was talken 
from the income of the estate and used for cap¬ 
ital expenditures, the Trustees are hereby author¬ 
ized and directed to reimburse and restore to in¬ 
come said amount and to make the necessarv ad- 
justment and charges against capital in their ac¬ 
counts to be hereafter submitted to the Court, and 
when the said amount is restored to income, to dis¬ 
tribute the same to the life tenants entitled there¬ 
to, in quarterly installments of One Thousand Dol¬ 
lars ($1,000) to each beneficiary.” 


Ithe j 
be ^ 


m 


It will be noted that the funds ordered restored to 
the income account were not to be paid out forthright 
to the existing life beneficiaries, but, following 
terms of the testator's will, when restored were to 
distributed “to the life tenants entitled thereto, 
quarterly installments” of $1,000.00. 

Thereafter, on April 8th, 1932,. the trustees file<J a 
“Petition and Report” wherein, after setting out that 
reports had been filed by them with the Auditor annu¬ 
ally since April, 1915, they referred to the situation 
regarding credits due the income account in the follow¬ 
ing language: 




4 


“No formal audit of these accounts was made 
by the Auditor, although annually the said Paul 
A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, as the sole 
persons then entitled to the income from said es¬ 
tate, have approved each and every item of dis¬ 
bursement shown in said annual accounts, which 
cover the period from December 1, 1914, to April 
16,1931. 

“Owing to the fact that the provisions of the 
Will of the said testator required all funds derived 
from the sale of real estate to be reinvested in 
other productive real estate, the Trustees of this 
estate have been unable to create a capital cash 
fund with which to meet capital obligations, such 
as payment of curtails and extensions of loans, 
capital betterments and charges, and frequently 
these have been paid out of income with the con¬ 
sent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, 
the beneficiaries entitled to the net income from 
said estate. 

“By decree entered herein on January 19, 1932, 
it was directed that the sum of ^32;9S2.06, which 
appeared from the evidence to have been taken 
from income and used for capital expenditures, 
should be restored to income and distributed to 
the life beneficiaries entitled to the net income 
and the said Trustees should make the necessary 
adjustments and charges in their accounts to be 
thereafter submitted to the Court and when the 
said amount is restored to income, to distribute 
the isame to the life tenants entitled thereto, in 
quarterly installments of $1,000.00 to each benefi- 
ciarv.” 


Along with this report exhibits were filed showing 
in detail all payments made during the period of the 
trust by income on behalf of capital and by capital on 
behalf of income, resulting in the excess payments by 
income. The accounts submitted with this petition and 


D 


report were duly approved by a decree (May 
1932, R. p. 27) and jurisdiction was retained fo 
further necessary orders or instructions. 

The day following approval by the court of 
counts, that is, on May 27th, 1932, one of the life 
ficiaries, Paul A. Andrews, died, 
only two quarterly payments of $1,000.00 
been made to him in accordance with the January 
1932, decree. Following his death the trustees 
came into court, this time for instructions as to 
was legally entitled to the balance of income due ujider 
the decree of January 15, 1932—the second wife of 
said Paul A. Andrews, as Executrix of his estate, or 
his daughter, appellant here, as his only 4 ‘issue’’ un¬ 
der paragraph ‘‘Sixth” of the will creating the trust. 
Paragraph 5 of this petition stated— 

“Your petitioners further aver that the (iext 
quarterly date of restoration to income and |dis- 
tribution of $2,000.00 pursuant to the third para¬ 
graph of the decree of January 19, 1932, will be 
on August 17, 1932, and although your petitioners 
will have to borrow an additional amount before 
then, they do not know to whom to pay the share 
to which the said Paul A. Andrews would have 
been entitled, if living.” 

Answers to the rule issued on this petition were filed 
by the two interested parties, and upon the facts dis¬ 
closed by the record, the question was orally arghed 
and authorities filed. Thereafter the learned tidal 
judge filed a memorandum (R. p. 43) to the effect tjhat 
the court would enter an order directing the trustees 

i 

of the estate to pay and distribute the fund in questjion 
to appellant, daughter of deceased Paul A. Andrews, 
as against the claim of his executrix. Thereafter (he 



6 


Executrix filed a “Petition for a Rehearing” in which 
the only relief prayed was that the court should grant 
a new hearing in the matter (R. p. 44). The follow¬ 
ing March 25th the court filed an opinion wherein, 
without acting upon the iietition for rehearing, it re¬ 
versed its former decision and held in favor of Paul 
A. Andrews’ Executrix (R. p. 48). The appeal here 
is from the decree entered as a result of the court’s 
last opinion. 


ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 

Appellant here relies upon the following errors com¬ 
mitted below, to wit: 

1. In reversing its decision of January 10th, 1933* 
wherein the accumulated interest fund in question was 
awarded to appellant and entering the Decree of April 
14th, 1933. 

2. In acting finally upon Muriel Abbott Andrews’ 
petition for a rehearing, without affording appellant 
any opportunity to be heard thereon, and in entering 
a final decree reversing a previous order upon a peti¬ 
tion which requested a rehearing only. 

3. In holding that the will of Frank W. Andrews 
authorized and required the Trustees thereunder, by 
paragraph 6 thereof, to pay over accrued income to 
persons other than the two sons of testator therein 
mentioned and their issue. 

4. In construing the will of Frank W. Andrews as 
an entirety to provide that income accrued during the 
life of either of the beneficiaries thereunder, Paul A. 
Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, became their prop¬ 
erty prior to being actually paid over to them, and in 
thus holding that the Executrix of the Estate of Paul 



I 


A. Andrews was entitled to certain income accrued 
during his lifetime but not actually paid over to him 
or specifically set aside for his benefit, as against the 
claim of the issue of said Paul A. Andrews. 


ARGUMENT. 

i 

Pertinent Provisions of the Will. 

The will is set forth in extcnso at pages 38-43 ofi the 
Record, but for purposes of convenience the provisions 
thereof that seem pertinent to the question of construc- 
tion presented are set forth below: 

Paragraph “Fifth” gives to the testator’s wife for 
the period of her life “the use and income of all the 
rest and residue” of his estate, directing, howeve 


“that said income shall not be alienable by 
said wife, nor shall the same be liable for 
debts.” 


mv 

her 


Paragraph “Sixth” makes disposition of the estate 
after the death of testator’s wife, providing with! re¬ 
spect to the residuary estate that it should be held in 
trust until the death of the survivor of his two sons, 
thereafter to their issue. With respect to distribution 
of the income, all important here, the testator in this 
paragraph directed— 

“and my trustees shall dispose of the nett rents 
and income of said trust property arising before 
the conveyance just directed, as follows: They 
shall pay the said nett rents and income during the 
continuance of this trust by equal quarter yearly 
payments in every year in equal shares to such of 
my said two sons as may be living at the time | of 
payment and to the lawful issue then living ] of 


s 


cither of my said two sons who has then deceased 
(wheither such my son have died before or after 
me) such issue taking’ by representation accord¬ 
ing to the stocks the share which such mv deceased 
son would have taken if living. 

“I have given no part of my said residuary es¬ 
tate free of trust to my children, for the reason 
that It hey will be amply provided for from the 
fund coming to them under the will of my father, 
William T. Andrews.” (Italics supplied) 

Paragraph “Tenth" is significant when considered 
along with the quoted portion of “Sixth”— 

“I direct that the income herein bequeathed 
shall not be alienable bv anv benefieiarv either bv 
assignment or bv anv other method and the said 
income shall not be subject to be taken by his or 
her creditors by any process whatever”, 

as is Paragraph “ Thirteenth ”— 

“The decision of my trustees as to any question 
arising between capital and income shall be final 
and binding on all persons then or thereafter inter¬ 
ested.” 

APPLICABLE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 

Appellant has been unable to find but one case near 
enough in point of fact to that involved here as to be 
useful as a controlling authority; but the absence of 
such cases is the rule rather than the exception in con¬ 
struction suits. The solution of the question presented 
is not difficult, however, when the established rules of 
construction are applied to the facts disclosed by this 
record. The first of these rules, that the intention of 
the testator—which is to be “gathered from the four 



9 


corners of the will itself ”—must be the governing fac¬ 
tor, hardly needs more than mention— 

“The cardinal rule of testamentary construe- 

* 

tion, as already intimated, is that the plain intent 
of the testator as evinced by the language o£ his 
will must prevail. * * * Courts have spokeju of 
such intention as the ‘law’, the ‘pole star’ orj the 
‘soverign guide’ when referring to this governing 
principle of testamentary causes.” Schouler on 
Wills, 6th Ed., Vol. II, page 967, Sec. 855. 

Testator’s dominant purpose to keep his mojiey, 
capital and income, in the hands of his wife, his ^ons 
and their issue, as against claims or demands of ^ny 
other persons, is evident from every portion of jthe 
will where it might reasonably have been exhibited. 
The income shall not be alienable by the wife during 
her lifetime, nor liable for her debts; at her dentil, 
when the sons take, the power to alienate “by assign¬ 
ment or bv anv other method” is affirmatively with- 

m/ m/ f 

held as to them and successive beneficiaries, and jtlie 
income is guarded against seizure by creditors “by any 
process whatever”. Investments are limited to ileal 

i 

estate, and in order to make these restrictive provi¬ 
sions regarding alienation of income more effective, 
the trustees are given absolute discretion to determine 
questions between capital and income—otherwise, 
questions of vesting, equitable conversion and the like 
might give outsiders a foothold. All of these provi¬ 
sions of the will, contained in separate paragraphs, 
when taken and considered in connection with the lan¬ 
guage of paragraph “Sixth” that the income shall be 
paid quarterly to such of testator’s sons as are living 
at the time of payment and to the lawful issue then 
living of either son then deceased, lead irresistibly to 


10 


the conclusion that the testator’s gift to his wife, his 
sons and their issue was of actual as opposed to theo¬ 
retical income, and give to the words of paragraph 
“Sixth” a clear and unambiguous meaning. Unpaid 
accumulations of income upon the death of a bene- 
ficiarv 2:0 to his issue; all but testator’s own descen- 
dants are barred from its enjoyment. 

Paragraph “Tenth” is that— 

“the income herein bequeathed shall not be alien¬ 
able bv any beneficiary either bv assignment or 

bv anv other method and the said income shall not 
» * 

be subject to be taken bv his or her creditors bv 
any process whatever.” 

This provision is not only consistent with the theory 
that he intended the sons to have onlv such income as 
was paid over to them by the trustees and not accumu¬ 
lations, but dovetails with that theory. What happens 
if this accumulated income is given to the executor of 
the deceased son’s estate, as is urged on the other side ? 
It is alienated by will, and it thus becomes “subject to 
be taken” bv that son’s creditors for debts contracted 
by him during his lifetime in derogation of the rights 
of the testator’s grandchild, a thing absolutely for¬ 
bidden by paragraph “Tenth”. The court cannot con- 1 . 
sistently give effect to paragraph “Tenth” of this will 
and at the same time reject appellant’s contentions! 

X 01 * should it be overlooked, in thus taking the will 
“by its four corners” that the testator provided the 
income was to be paid only in “equal quarter yearly 
payments”—a thing impossible in a trust limited to 
investments in real estate unless aided by powers such 
as are given the trustees in paragraph “Thirteenth” 
to determine questions between capital and income. 



11 


The testator and his scrivener must have realize^ that 
it would be impossible to pay out from assets composed 
entirely of real estate holdings income calculated upon 
a theoretical bookkeeping basis 4 4 in equal quarter 
yearly payments”. Theoretical income which flight 
accrue upon the books could not be paid out 44 in lequal 
quarter yearly payments,” and would be subject to 
attachment bv creditors were it absolutely “vested”; 
but when subject to the trustees’ determination under 
paragraph 44 Thirteenth” and the provision of 44 Sjxth” 
that it should not belong to any particular beneficiary 
until actually paid over to him, the scheme to confine 
payments of accumulated income absolutely to the sons 
and their issue appears complete. 

The rule just discussed is referred to as the 44 car¬ 
dinal rule of construction.” But there is a seconcj. one 
intimately related to the first and just as firmly estab¬ 
lished in our law—that courts in construing wills jnust 
give the words used therein their full and naiural 
meaning. Rule XVI of Mr. Jarman’s famous twenty- 
four rules of construction is— 

44 That words, in general, are to be taken in their 
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear in- 
tention to use them in another can be collected, 
and that other can be ascertained; and they are, 
in all cases, to receive a construction which jwill 
give to every expression some effect, rather than 
one that will render any of the expressions inoper¬ 
ative. * * *” 2 Jarman on Wills, (6th Am. hjld.). 


Or, as Schouler puts it— 

4 4 It is the intention of the testator as expressed 
in his own will which governs; and this paramount 
intention must be discerned through the word^ of 


i 


the will itself, as applied to the subject-matter and 

the surrounding circumstances. In other words, 

the plain and unambiguous words of the will must 

prevail and cannot be controlled or qualified by 

any conjectural or doubtful construction growing 

out of the situation, circumstances or conditions 

ol* the testator, his property or the natural objects 

of his bountv. 

% 

“The real inquiry is not what the testator in¬ 
tended! to express but what the words used do ex¬ 
press.” Sehoider, 6th Ed., Vol. II, pp. 975-6, Sec. 
859. 


“V'ljien the language of a will is plain no judi¬ 
cial construction should be indulged in, and con¬ 
struction cannot go so far as to make or amend a 
will.” \ Schmdcr, Vol. 2, Sec. 838, p. 642. 

“Words in general, whether technical or popu¬ 
lar. are to be taken in their plain and usual sense, 
unless a clear intention to use them in another 
sense can be collected and that sense ascertained 
besides. All things being equal, the natural and 
literal import of words and phrases is presumed 
to have been intended; and each word is to have 
its effect, if the general intent be not thwarted 
thereby.” Sell older, Vol. 2, Sec. 865, p. 984. 


The following are a few other statements of this 
rule— 


“It is the dutv of the court to ascertain the in- 
tentioii of the testator from the words he has used 
and to ascertain and give effect to the legal conse¬ 
quences of that intention when ascertained. * * * 
In construing a will the words and expressions 
used are to be construed in their ordinary, proper 
and grammatical sense.” Thompson, Wills, Sec. 
157, p. 136. 

“In construing a will effect should be given to 
every word and clause if not inconsistent with the 


13 


general intent of the whole will when taken to¬ 
gether. It is presumed that every word is in¬ 
tended bv the testator to have some meaning, and 
no word or clause in the will is to be rejected to 
which a reasonable effect can be given.” 28 R. C. 
L., Sec. 176, p. 217. 

i i 

In the case of Wright v. Denn, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 
204, 239, Mr. Justice Story remarked that— 

“It is our duty to give effect to all the words of 
a will, if, by the rules of law, it can be done. And 
where words occur in a will their plain and ordi¬ 
nary sense is to be attached to them, unless the 
testator manifestly applies them in some other 
sense.” 

i 

Upon authority of this same rule this court refused 
to construe the words “wife or child or children” to 
mean wife and child or children” although the lan¬ 
guage used seemed to defeat a dominant purpose of the 
testator. And this decision was upheld upon appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Travers 
v. Reinhard, 25 D. C. App. 567; 205 U. S. 423. Cfther 
decisions by this court in which the rule is referred to 
and applied are— 

DeVauglm r. DeVauglm, 3 App. D. C. 53; 

Cruit v. Owen, 25 App. D. C. 514; 

Mayo v. Whedon, 47 App. D. C. 138. 

In the Cruit v. Owen case, supra, the court in referring 
to this rule of construction said— 

“In construing a will the whole will must: be 
read together, and each term employed giveij its 
full natural meaning; and no words of the tejsta- 



14 


tor should bo rejected or refused their sensible 
meaning: in the place where employed, unless it be 
required to make sense for the context of the 
will.” 


And in Mayo r. Whcdoii, supra — 

“It is tlie dutv of the court to give to words of 
a will their full natural meaning.” 


The particular words of this will which appellant 
urges should be given their full, natural, grammatical 
effect are that the trustees in respect to income— 

“shall pay * * * the net income * * " to such of my 
said two sons as may he liriny at the time of pay¬ 
ment and to the lawful issue then living of either 
of mv said two sons who has then deceased.” 
(Italics supplied) 


If the rule of construction thus laid down bv the text 

* 

writers, stated by the Supreme Court of the United 

States and manv times announced bv this honorable 

* * 

tribunal is to be given effect here, what meaning is to 
be ascribed to these words of the testator? It is clear 
to anyone! who reads the English language, it would 
seem, that the trustees are limited in respect to any 
payments of accumulated income to such of the sons 
as may bej living at the time of payment. The adverb 
“then” is first used to modify the verb “living” and 
in the second instance to modify “deceased”; in each 
case the word clearly relates back to the prepositional 
phrase “at the time of payment,” making the time 
when the monev is paid into a living beneficiarv’s 
hands thei test as to the right to receive it. The test 
is clear and simple: Who in direct line of descent 
from the testator is living to receive and receipt for, 



15 


inter vivos, the particular income accumulation. And 
thus the income, as well as the principal, is kept 
strictly within the family, according to the testator’s 
clear intent. 

As heretofore said, this dovetails with the provision 
of paragraph “Tenth” and any other construction 
would necessarily do violence to the intendment 
thereof. 

Suppose for argument that Paul A. Andrews had 
died intestate with appellant, his daughter, as hi>j only 
heir at law. And that after the death of her parent 
but before any income was paid over to her she had 
died. How would a claim of her creditors asserted 
through a personal representative as against the rights 
of her issue, be resolved? Is there anv doubt but that 

. * i 

actual payment not having been made to her in her 
lifetime, nothing would pass under her will or by op¬ 
eration of law in the event of intestacy; and tha|t the 
directions of the will would act upon the accumulated 
fund and pass it on to her issue? That case is pre- 
ciselv the same as the one presented here. 


THE CASE OF LOMBARD V. WITBECK. 

The case nearest to the instant one in point of fact, 
so far as counsel have been able to find, is tliajt of 
Lombard v. Wit beck (1898), reported in 173 Ill. 396; 
51 X. E. 61. There the testator bequeathed his prop¬ 
erty to trustees, with direction, after the usual state¬ 
ment of the trusts, that they should— j 

“hold said last named residue estate for the use 
and benefit of the last named three grandchildren 
during their lifetime, the net income therefrom to 
be divided into three equal parts, one part to be 
paid to each of said last named grandchildren from 


16 


time to time, as my said trustees and their survi¬ 
vors in trust shall in their judgment deem for the 
best interests of said grandchildren.” 


By a succeeding paragraph it was provided that— 

4i I further provide and direct that in case of the 
death of either of my said three grandchildren, 
Frank M. Wit beck, Gertrude 11. Witbeck and 
Henry J. Witbeck, leaving issue or descendants 
of issue them surviving and born in laful wed¬ 
lock, the one-third share of all of mv estate left 
for said last named three grandchildren shall de- 
cend to such issue or descendants of issue of each 
child so deceased, such issue and descendants of 
issue to take per stirpes and not per capita; and 
in case anv one or more of said last named three 
grandchildren shall die without leaving anv such 
issue or descendants of issue, then said one-third 
share of mv said residue estate shall go to the sur- 
vivor or survivors of said last named three grand¬ 
children. ” 


By still another paragraph the trustees were given 
authoritv, in their discretion, to make advancements to 
the life beneficiaries out of the personal estate, and 
further, that should any grandchild become intemper¬ 
ate or otherwise incompetent to manage his or her es¬ 
tate to— 


44 withhold any or all of said income from such 
grandchild and to add the same to the principal 
sum from which said income was derived, and to 
withhold such income for such period of time as 
my said trustees and their successors in trust 
shall,'in their discretion, deem for the best interest 
of such grandchild.” 


The estate, which was a large one, was probated in 
Cook County, Illinois. 


17 


The trustees divided the net income into three} parts 


je part 
order 
bene- 
ments 


book- 

tander 

tment 


and credited in an “Income Trust Account” on! 
to each grandchild. This account was kept in 
that the trustees might distribute income to the| 
ficiaries as and when they decided to make pay 
under the provisions of the will. It appeared that 
credits to this account were not intended by them as 
the equivalent of distributions, but were simply a 
keeping convenience. They kept another account 
the name of each beneficiarv denominated “Inves 
Trust Account” and to this was credited that portion 
of the income trust account not paid over to tl}e life 
beneficiaries. “This was done so that that whicth ac¬ 
crued might be held subject to a subsequent division.” 

One of testator's said grandchildren died leaving no 
issue and a dispute arose between the administrator of 
sucli deceased grandchild and the other life beneficia¬ 
ries of the estate as to who was entitled to a siJm of 
$20,375 credited to the decedent in the “Injcome 
Trust Account.” The contention was made by the 
administrator, just as in the instant case, that tin 
ting apart and earmarking of this money vested 
thereto in the deceased beneficiary so as to pass 
his administrator. In its opinion, the court held 
this accrued or accumulated income, despite the 
that it was credited on the books to the deceased 
passed to tlie surviving heirs rather than to thef ad 
ministrator, saying: 

“The fact that the trustees had not actually 
turned this fund back into the principal estat 
they were authorized to do by clause 20 of the 
but kept it separate as a matter of convenience in 
bookkeeping, did not amount to a transfer of it to 
the individual estate of Henry J. Witbeck.” 


set- 
title 
it to 
that 
fact 
heir, 


as 


kvill. 



18 


As hereinbefore stated, this case is the closest in 
point of fact to the instant one counsel has been able to 
find; and it is submitted to the Court as being a strong 
authority!in support of appellant’s contentions. But 
appellantts chief reliance is the settled rules of con¬ 
struction as applied to the particular language of this 
will rather than case precedent. 


The Decree of January 19, 1932, Did Not Vest Any In¬ 
terest in the Fund in the Then Life Beneficiaries 
But Only Provided for Payment to the “Life Bene¬ 
ficiaries Entitled Thereto” “When” the Amount 
Was Restored to Income. 


The parties to the Decree of January 19th, 1932, and 
the learned judge who signed that decree (not the 
tjttnae one who ruled upon the question here presented) 
must have foreseen that should either of the then bene¬ 
ficiaries die any portion of the fund undistributed 
would pass under the trust to the issue of such de¬ 


ceased; for that decree after authorizing the trustees 


to reimburse and restore to the income account the 
amount in question, went on to provide: 


“TT7/c^ the said amount is restored to income” 
it should be distributed *7o the life tenant* en¬ 
titled thereto , in quarterly installments.” (Italics 
supplied) 


At the time the decree complained of was signed the 
record showed (K. p. 31, paragraph 5) that only a small 
portion of the fund had been restored, and that the 
trustees would have to borrow monev for restoration 
purposes before any further quarterly installment 
could be made. It was theoretical or book income, in 
no form to be “then” paid over. In this connection 


19 


the learned trial justice was in error as to the true fact, 

| 7 

for he thought, when he prepared his final opinion, that 

the income item had been “fully restored” (R. p. 49). 

And this error of fact mav have been the foundation 

* 

of his decision. j 

If the fund in question by the Decree of January 
19th, 1932, vested so as to become the property of 
Paul A. Andrews, his creditors could have come in and 
attached the same for his debts; and that would i[nani- 
festly be a situation the testator had in mind avoijding. 

ANY DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE COURT 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF AP¬ 
PELLANT. 

Appellant is a granddaughter of the testator, Frank 
W. Andrews, and as the sole issue of her father, Paul 
A. Andrews, is opposed to an executrix of his estate. 
It can be assumed that some portion at least of this 
fund if it is turned over to the executrix will be ^ised 
for debts—a thing enjoined by paragraph “Tenth” 
of the will—and thus testator’s “issue” are arrived 
in effect against his son’s “debtors.” In Sliermom v. 
American Security & Trust Company, 57 D. C. 273 ? the 
rule, generally applicable elsewhere, that doubtful will 
construction questions should be resolved in favor of 
the testator’s kindred, was applied to this jurisdiction. 
We see no good reason why, if any doubt exists ais to 
a proper construction 1o be given in the instant c^ase, 
appellant should not invoke and the court apply this 
rule. 


20 


CONCLUSION. 

It is submitted that the plain meaning of the lan¬ 
guage of paragraph “Sixth” in question here and the 
only meaning consistent with the general intent and 
purpose of the testator as gathered from the other por¬ 
tions of the will, is that the sons should be entitled to 
income onlv when it was paid to them, and that anv 
unpaid accumulations should pass to their issue; that 

thev were to receive only actual income to them in hand 

• 

paid; and hence it follows that the fund involved be¬ 
longs to appellant. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Frost, Myers & Towers, 
i Attorneys for Appellant. 







WALTER 

KOPER, 


aiEF 0$ BEHABF OF AFPELUffi 
ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX ITOD -3 
PAUL A; ANDREWS, DECEASED 


Executrix uptaer the 
A. Andr&vdfDeceased. 


Attorney 
Andr\ 
: of Pa 


PRESS OF JUDD <fc DETWEILEB, INC., WASHINGTON 









I 

{Jonrt of J^tals, jjistriri 4 ^Jolpte. 


No. 6025 


MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, Appellant, 


WALTER S. ANDREWS, REGINALD S. HUIDE- 
KOPER, MORGAN BELMONT, Trustees, eIt. au 


BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE, MURIEL ABBOTT 
ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX UNDER THE ^TILL OF 
PAUL A. ANDREWS, DECEASED. 


Statement. 

The will of Frank W. Andrews was admitted to probate 
by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on July 
8, 1903. 

By his said will the testator gave, devised and be¬ 
queathed to his wife, for and during the term of hej natural 
life, the use and income of all the rest and residue of his 
estate, real and personal, subject to the requirement on her 
part to the payment out of said income of all taxes Assessed 
against any of the real estate, the interest on any, and all 
debts secured by liens thereon, the cost of maintaining 


lv 


9 


proper insurance upon the improvements thereon, and the 
expense of keeping said improvements in a good state of re¬ 
pair (Rec. 39-40). 

At the death of his wife, which occurred on November 22, 
1914, the testator gave, devised and bequeathed all of the 
said rest, residue and remainder of his estate, except a few 
family articles, in trust during the lives of his two sons, 
Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, and during the 
life of the survivor of them; and directs that during the 
continuance of the trust the trustees shall dispose of and 
pay in every year the net rents and income of the trust prop¬ 
erty by quarter yearly payments in equal shares to such 
of his said two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬ 
ment and to the lawful issue then living of either of his 
said two sons who has then deceased (Rec. 40-41). 

The trust involved in this case became active on Decem¬ 
ber 1, 1914, at i which time the corpus of the trust estate 
consisted of five pieces of improved real estate in the Dis¬ 
trict of Columbia (Rec. 20). 

By the will the trustees are authorized and empowered, 
in their discretion, to sell at public auction or at private 
sale, or to lease any portion or the whole of the corpus of 
the trust estate; but in case of any such sale or sales the 
testator further directs that the reinvestment of the pro¬ 
ceeds thereof shall be in other productive real estate (Rec. 
41). Because of this provision of the will the trustees 
have been unable to create a capital cash fund with which 
to meet capital obligations, such as payment of curtails 
and extensions of loans, capital betterments and charges, 
and by reason thereof, during the period from December 
1, 1914, to December 31, 1931, such obligations have fre¬ 
quently been paid out of the net income of said trust prop¬ 
erty with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. 
Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled during said period to 
the net income from the trust estate (Rec. 22-23). 



3 


Because of existing and maturing capital obligations, the 
trustees filed the original petition in this cause praying 
for authority and power to encumber by mortgage or deed 
of trust any pieces or parcels of the real estate owned by 
tlie trust estate, in order to provide funds to m^et matur¬ 
ing encumbrances, charges and taxes when they fall due, 
or to provide for the continuation or renewal of existing 
encumbrance or encumbrances on any part of jsaid real 
estate (Rec. 2-15). 

Thereafter, on January 19, 1932, the Court entered its de¬ 
cree upon said petition. By paragraph III thereof, said 
decree provides as follows: | 

“It appearing from the evidence that tli^ sum of 
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two Dol¬ 
lars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the in¬ 
come of the estate and used for capital expenditures, 
the Trustees are hereby authorized and directed to 
reimburse and restore to income said amount and to 
make the necessary adjustment and charge^ against 
capital in their accounts to lie hereafter submitted to 
the Court, and when the said amount is restored to 
income, to distribute the same to the life tenants, en¬ 
titled thereto, in quarterly installments of Oijie Thou¬ 
sand Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary;” (|Iec. 17). 

At the date of the passage of said decree both of|the said 
sons of the testator were living; but thereafter, jon May 
27, 1932, Paul A. Andrews died, leaving a last will and 
testament which was duly admitted to probate anc|l record 
on September 15, 1932, by the Probate Court, in land for 
the County of Suffolk, State of Massachusetts, in which 
he appoints his widow, the appellee herein, as the execu¬ 
trix thereunder, and to whom he gives, devises and be¬ 
queaths his residuary estate (Rec. 35). j 

Prior to his death the trustees paid to Paul A. Andrews 
two quarterly payments of $1,000 each in accordance with 


2v 



4 


said decree of January 19, 1932, leaving a balance of $14,- 
491.03 of one-half of the sum of $32,982.00 which the Court 
found had been taken bv the trustees from the net income 
of the trust property prior to said decree and used for 
capital expenditures. 

On August 15, 1932, the trustees tiled herein their sup¬ 
plemental petition in which they allege that this appellee, 
upon her qualification as executrix of the estate of Paul A. 
Andrews, deceased, will claim (and subsequently claimed) 
that the said unpaid balance of $14,491.03 was, pursuant 
to said decree of January 19, 1932, distributable to her as 
such executrix; that the appellant herein claimed that 
under said will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and said 
decree of January 19, 1932, the said sum was distributable 
to her, she being the onlv child of Paul A. Andrews, de- 
ceased; that “they did not know to whom to pay the share 
to which the said Paul A. Andrews would have been en¬ 
titled, if living,” and prayed for the Court’s directions 
and instructions with respect thereto (Rec. 31). 

Thereafter, on April 14, 1933, the Court entered its fur¬ 
ther decree herein, in and by which it finds that upon the 
death of the said Paul A. Andrews the unpaid balance of 
$14,491.03 of said net income passed to, became vested in 
and payable to his estate in the same manner and at the 
times as directed bv said decree of Januarv 19, 1932, and 
directs the trustees to make payment thereof in accordance 
therewith. From this decree the present appeal is being 
prosecuted. 

ARGUMENT. 

I. 

As to the Will of Frank W. Andrews. 


We have no controversy with counsel for appellant re¬ 
specting the settled rules of construction of wills as an- 


I 


nounced in the decisions of our courts and by t(pxt writers 
on the subject of wills. 

Except as to sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of the 
will showing the source from which the two sons of the tes¬ 
tator derived title to and became vested with t|ie various 
sums, aggregating the sum of $32,982.06, of t|ie annual 
accrued net income from the trust property tal^en by the 
trustees, with the consent of the two beneficiaries, and used 
for capital expenditures, we are not concerned with said 
will, or with the other paragraphs thereof referred to in 
appellant *s brief. 

The decision on the question herein involved jis neither 
dependent upon nor requires a construction by the court 
of the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased. Whatever con¬ 
struction is necessary or required as to the decision of this 
question, is as to the decree of January 19, 1932, Which de¬ 
termined and fixed the rights and interest of the parties, 
including the appellant herein, with respect to said sum. 

Considering, however, the question solely from the stand¬ 
point of the will and aside from the decree of January 
19, 1932, we respectfully submit, the court below did not 
err in decreeing that the unpaid balance of one-half of 
the various sums of the annual net income, aggregating 
the sum of $32,982.06, taken by the trustees, with the con¬ 
sent of Paul A. Andrews, the beneficiary entitled thereto, 
and used for capital expenditures or obligations, vras the 
property of Paul A. Andrew’s, and at his death passed to, 
became vested in and payable to his estate. 

By said sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of said 
will the testator directs that his trustees: 

‘ 4 shall dispose of the net rents and income of said trust 
property arising before the conveyance just directed, as 
follows: They shall pay the said net rents and income 
during the continuance of this trust by equal | quarter 


yearly payments in every year in equal shares to such 
of my said two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬ 
ment, etc.-’ 


This language of the will is clear and definite and needs 
no construction. It expressly directs and requires that the 
trustees shall dispose of the net rents and income of said 
trust property in every year , by equal quarter yearly pay¬ 
ments to testator’s two sons, if living at the time such quar¬ 
ter yearly payments become payable. There is no power 
contained in the will, discretionary or otherwise, giving to 
the trustees the right to withhold or to accumulate any por¬ 
tion of said annual net rents and income of the trust prop¬ 
erty, or to divert, use or dispose of it, or any part thereof, 
in any manner except by equal quarter yearly payments 
in every year U> his said two sons, if living at the time such 
payments become due and payable. 

The record in this case, including the reports of the trus¬ 
tees filed herein with their petitions, shows that prior to the 
decree of January 19, 1932, there had been taken by the 
trustees from the net annual accrued income, to which the 
two sons were entitled in every year, various sums, aggre¬ 
gating the sum of $32,982.06 at the date of said decree, and 
used for capital expenses, and that the said various sums so 
taken and used by the trustees were, at the time of the tak¬ 
ing, from the net annual income which had accrued in vari¬ 
ous years prior thereto, and which said income the trustees 
were directed and required to pay to testator’s said two 
sons who were living at the end of each vear of its accrual. 


The trustees being without power or authority under the 
will to dispose of the annual net income from the trust 
property except as therein directed, they could not, there¬ 
fore, take or use the same or any part thereof for capital 
expenditures or obligations save with the consent of the 
beneficiaries then entitled thereto, and this they obtained. 


By obtaining such consent from the said two sons of the 
testator, the trustees thereby recognized that t^ie various 
sums aggregating the sum of $32,982.06, so taken and used, 
was from the accrued annual net income and tli|at the tes¬ 
tator's said two sons were entitled thereto. Unless tes¬ 
tator’s said two sons had been vested with and entitled to 
have paid over to them as their property suc|h accrued 
annual net income at the time or times when thelsame was 

i 

so taken and used by the trustees, then the obtaining of 
their consent to said taking for such use would have been 
an unnecessary and useless thing. 

Since the trustees were expressly directed and required 
by the will to pay in every year the annual net income from 
the trust property to the said two sons of the testator liv¬ 
ing at the time fixed by the will for each quarter yearly 
payment thereof, we respectfully submit that in 'this case, 
under the familiar maxims, ‘‘equity regards that as done 
which ought to be done” and “equity regards ihtent and 
substance rather than form,” equity will regard the quarter 
yearly payments in every year as having been made by the 
trustees to testator’s two sons at the times when jthe same 
should have been made to them in accordance witjli the di¬ 
rections in the will, and will treat said two sons of the 
testator as vested with the same interest and eiititled to 


the same rights as if the payment of said incom|e by the 
trustees had actuallv been made; that such income became 
their absolute property, freed from the trust, at the times 
when the same should have been paid; and that tl^e taking 
and use of said income by the trustees, with the consent 
of testator’s said two sons, was in effect a loan or advance 
by them to the trustees for the purposes of tjie trust 

J I 

estate. | 

The provision of said sub-paragraph of said \|ill with 
respect to the quarter yearly payments of income j“to the 


8 


lawful issue then living of either of mv said two sons who 

has then deceased” refers to and could onlv refer to such 

* 

quarter yearly payments accruing and payable after and 
in the year of the death of either of said sons, since the 
said sub-paragraph expressly directs the payment of the 
net rents and income in every year, and the will does not 
clothe the trustees with power and authority to withhold 
or to accumulate the income or any part thereof, or to 
dispose of it otherwise than by payments in every year of 
its accrual to the beneficiaries entitled thereto at the times 
fixed for such payments. In this connection and because 
of the lack of such power of the trustees in this case to 
withhold or to accumulate or otherwise to dispose of the 
income from the trust property, or any part thereof, we 
respectfully submit that the case of Lombard v. Witbeck, 
173 Ill. 396, has no bearing on or application to the facts 
in this case. In that case the trustees were expressly 
clothed with discretionary power and authority with re¬ 
spect to the disposition of the income from the trust es¬ 
tate. They were authorized to pay such part of the income 
to each of the beneficiaries as the trustees in their judg¬ 
ment should deem for the best interest of such beneficiary; 
and they were also authorized, in their discretion, to with¬ 
hold anv or all of the share of the income and add the 
% 

same to the principal from which the same was derived, 
of any beneficiary who should become intemperate or other¬ 
wise incompetent to manage his or her estate. 

II. 

Paragraphs Tenth and Thirteenth of the Will. 

The Tenth paragraph directs that the income shall not be 
alienable bv anv beneficiary either bv assignment or other 
method, and shall not be subject to be taken by creditors by 
any process whatever. 


9 


It is perfectly obvious that this paragraph of t,}ie will has 
no application to this case, since there was no alienation or 
attempted alienation by assignment or otherwise) by either 
of the testator’s sons, or a taking or an attempted taking 
by creditors of either of them by any process whatever, 
prior to the accrual and the vesting in said two sfms of the 
various sums of income, aggregating $32,982.06; and there 
are no restrictions on the life beneficiaries, or either of 
them, with respect to the use and disposition of income pay¬ 
able to them after the same was paid over to them). 

The Thirteenth paragraph makes the decision of the 
trustees as to any question arising between capital and in¬ 
come final and binding on all persons then and thereafter 
interested. 

As to the fund herein involved, there is no occasion for 
a decision by the trustees as between capital anq income. 
If there was ever any necessity therefor, then the) trustees 
themselves, as shown by the record, ascertained ajid deter¬ 
mined that the said sum of $32,982.06 was income jfrom the 
trust property. Paragraph III of the decree of |January 
19, 1932, likewise determined that said sum was ta^en from 
income, and directed the restoration thereof to income. 

III. j 

I 

The Decree of January 19, 1932. j 

The hereinbefore quoted paragraph III of the final decree 
of January 19, 1932, on the original petition filecj by the 
trustees in this cause, in clear and definite langua|ge fixed 
and determined the rights and interests of the j various 
parties thereto, including the appellant in this ca^e, with 
respect to the said sum of $32,982.06, of which a balance of 
$14,491.03 of one-half thereof is herein involved. It con¬ 
stitutes an adjudication by the court of an indebtedjness by 
the trustees to the then living life tenants, Paul A. Ajndrews 



10 


and Walter S. Andrews, growing out of the taking by the 
trustees, with the consent of said life tenants, of accrued 
income theretofore coming into their hands, belonging to 
and payable to said life tenants, and used by said trustees 
for capital expenditures in connection with the administra¬ 
tion of the trust property. 

Said paragraph III of said decree determined that the 
aforesaid sum of $32,9S2.00 was taken from the accrued in¬ 
come of the trust estate in prior years and used for capital 
expenditures, and authorized and directed the trustees to 
restore the same to income. Again applying the familiar 
maxim that “equity regards that as done which ought to 
be done”, then equity will treat its direction to restore said 
sum to income as having been done at the date of said 
decree. 

When said sum is restored to income, said paragraph 
further directs the trustees to distribute the same to the 
life tenants entitled thereto. Who were they? There can 
be no question, we respectfully submit, that the life ten¬ 
ants referred to bv the court were the two sons of the tes- 

%> 

tat or, who were vested with and entitled to have paid to 
them bv the trustees the various sums of accrued net income 
from the trust property, aggregating said sum of $32,982.06, 
taken by the trustees, with their consent, and used for 
capital expenditures. 

That said paragraph of the decree further directs said 
restored sum to be distributed in quarterly installments of 
$1,000 to each beneficiary, does not lessen or change the de¬ 
termined and fixed rights and interests of testator’s said 
two sons in and to said sum so directed to be restored. The 


manner of such distribution was due to the fact, as the rec¬ 
ord shows, that the trustees were not in a position to make 
immediate payment thereof in one sum because of lack of 
funds and being under the necessitv of borrowing monev. 


11 


Conclusion. 

In conclusion we submit: 

1. Because of the fact that the will makes no pro¬ 
vision FOR A FUND OUT OF WHICH TO MEET CAPITAL EXPENDI¬ 
TURES, THE CONSENT OF THE LIFE BENEFICIARIES TO TpE USE BY 
THE TRUSTEES OF INCOME THEN DUE AND PAYABLE [TO THEM 
UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF PARAGRAPH 

Sixth of the will to meet necessary capital expenditures, 

CONSTITUTED NOTHING MORE NOR LESS THAN A LOAN BY SUCH 

I 

LIFE BENEFICIARIES TO THE TRUSTEES TO MEET THE EXIGENCIES 
OF THE SITUATION. 

I 

2. That the decree appealed from established a debt 
due the life beneficiaries amounting to $32,982.06 arising 

FROM THE LOAN BY THEM OF THAT AMOUNT TO THE TRUSTEES 
FROM INCOME DUE AND PAYABLE TO THEM, ONE-HALF OF SUCH 
DEBT BEING PAYABLE TO EACH OF SAID BENEFICIARIES. 

3. That the balance of said debt adjudicated }n favor 
of said Paul A. Andrews, one of said beneficiaries, viz., 
$14,491.03, CONSTITUTES AN ASSET OF HIS ESTATE AND PASSED 
TO THIS APPELLEE, MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS, IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH HIS WILL, AND IS PAYABLE TO HER AS THE EXECUTRIX 
THEREUNDER. 


In view of the foregoing we submit that the decree of 
the court below appealed from should be by this Court 


affirmed. 

Benjamin S. Minor, 

H. Prescott Gatley, 
Arthur P. Drury, 

Attorneys for Appellee , Muriel Abbott 
Andrews , Executrix under the Will 
of Paul A. Andrews , Deceased. 


( 4385 )